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University of Pecs, Institute of Psychology, Hungary

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December 7th, 2020

Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade



Edited by Irina Bondarevskaya, Bojan Todosijević





# POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC **SELF-CONSTITUTION:** MEDIA, POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SELF-CONSTITUTION: MEDIA, POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY Proceedings of the VIII international scientific and practical seminar December 7th, 2020, Belgrade, Serbia

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# MEDIA AND POLITICAL CULTURE DURING COVID-19 PANDEMIC

# ANOMIC PHENOMENA AND COGNITIVE BIASES IN GOVERNMENT POLICIES TO STOP THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN ROMANIA

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**Introduction.** After 10 months since the launch of COVID-19, in the context of the current development of communication technologies, we appreciate as immeasurable the amount of information and opinions on the evolution and symptoms of the pandemic or of political and governmental projects and strategies to stop it. We will therefore try to review in the following some of their psycho-sociological effects.

**Objectives.** From the previous experiences of human communities that went through the tragedy of the Black Plague (1347 - 1352) or the "Spanish flu" of 1918, disturbing mnemonic traces have been preserved. We mention in this sense the "Decameron" of Boccacio, written in the time of the first, or the "Scream" of the painter Edward Much, a victim of the "Spanish flu". The societies that faced the mentioned diseases had to face states of imbalance and institutional disorder, recorded by the testimonies of the time and sociologically explainable by the concept of "anomie", launched by the French sociologist Emile Durkheim in the late nineteenth century to

designate a weakening of the collective consciousness, against the background of the destabilization of the old normative regime, in the absence of coherence and internalization of a new one (Durkheim, 1895). But can we talk about anomie in the current pandemic? The answer to this question would be the first **objective** of this theoretical study.

The second objective aims to identify, with the help of some ordering concepts and theories, some of the most common cognitive biases in the representation of government policies to stop the COVID-19 pandemic in Romania.

**Results.** In the operationalization of the anomic phenomena associated with the pandemic we consider three dimensions:

(1) The pandemic has generated major, unpredictable and unscheduled social changes, which have called into question the socialized and traditionally established models of relationships. The pandemic imposed untimely changes in the social relations system, with strong reverberations in the plan of daily life. The depth of the changes and the persistence of the disruptive factor did not allow the structuring and internalization of the new regime of the functioning of the society. This paints the typical, defining image of the anomic society.

(2) Robert Merton (1938) attributes new meanings to social anomie, which he links to the discrepancy between socially desirable goals and the means that society makes available to achieve them, respectively the goals and means of each individual. In a pandemic context, the social goal is to reduce the spread of the SARS-COV-2 virus. The legitimate means put in the service of the social purpose are governmental measures. As these measures are restrictive, coercive, and contradict other personal goals, the "rebels" in the Mertonian classification end up ahead of the "conformists". Exploratory discussions demonstrate the recurrence of reasoning such as: "I don't wear a mask, because I can't breathe properly." / "I can't stay in isolation for two weeks, I have important issues to solve, so I'll go out and hope I won't be caught." / "It doesn't matter if it's crowded, it's more important for me to participate in the religious ritual."

(3) The state becomes incapable of ensuring control, against the background of the generalized rebellion. This inability is illustrated by the closure of markets. After imposing the wearing of masks in the agri-food markets and finding that the measure was simply ignored by both customers and sellers, officials resorted to intensifying controls. Without success. It is even acknowledged by the Prime Minister of Romania, Ludovic Orban, according to whom the repeated controls "did not lead to a result, because the degree of compliance did not increase" (Capital, 2020). It has therefore resorted to the total closure of agri-food markets and, thus, to the recognition of the state's inability to ensure compliance with the new rules, not yet internalized by citizens, a landscape typical of public limited companies.

Anomic phenomena are closely related to cognitive biases. From a psychosociological perspective, by cognitive biases we designate an extensive category of concepts and judgments that exaggerate the pros or cons of something (phenomenon, behavior, individual, group) in an incorrect and/or unfair way. Theories and explanations of the genesis, evolution and management of pandemics also bear their imprint. Aspects, implicitly, causal explanations are implicitly attributed to aspects, phenomena, and events perceived through the senses. For causal patterns naturally dominate our thinking, the phenomenon being designated as a process of attribution. By virtue of this predisposition, the individual attributes a more or less appropriate cause to a perceived effect.

In the case of the 2020 pandemic, as well as that of 1918, the contemporaries perceive the effects, not the cause. The process by which the virus – the tiny particle of living matter – makes sick and sometimes kills the human being of colossal size and power in relation to it, was described by Laura Spinney (a biologist with appreciable expertise in media communication) as follows:

"... a virus cannot reproduce outside a host cell. For a virus to enter a host cell, it must first attach to the receptors on the cell surface. The link must be very good, like a key in a padlock, but when this happens a cascade of molecular events is triggered that allow the virus to enter the cell (an antibody acts by attaching to one of those antigens, preventing thus the virus attaches to the receptors of the host cell)." (Spinney, 2019: 217 - 219).

How many individuals are prepared or/and willing to imagine this process unfolding in the cellular micro-universe, an "object" more difficult to represent than the macro-universe of celestial bodies? It is understood that most contemporaries of previous pandemics have attributed causes of the order of divinity or occult forces. Many contemporaries think the same way. The consistent arguments in this regard come from the media.

Romanian television news programs have constantly presented Orthodox ceremonies (Sunday services, pilgrimages) where crowds refuse to abide by government decisions (wearing a mask and respecting social distance) on the grounds that God's protection is more effective than all. Orthodox Church leaders have publicly argued against the authorities' regulations with the "argument" that the virus cannot be transmitted through substances or objects of worship. (Antena 3, 2020). However, similar situations of attribution errors were in other situations, close to our days. In 1987, for example, when asked about AIDS, 43% of Americans labeled it as a punishment from God for the immorality of sexual behavior (Spinney, 2019: 100).

However, the general tendency to attribute external causes to the negative events in our lives is also functional; when evil is in the hands of others, we blame them. This cognitive distortion is called fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977 apud Betea, 2015: 200). In these cases we resort to the causal register of social schemes, models, patterns and stereotypes. Of greater complexity are social stereotypes defined as networks of information and procedures about a particular group. Fertile in their appearance and functionality are the historical periods of anxiety, fear and insecurity, characteristic of pandemics and which involve, as we mentioned, multiple anomic phenomena. When "society suffers, it feels the need to find someone to blame for harm, who can take revenge for its disappointments," explains Emil Durkheim (1895) the emergence of special stereotypes. Called by Raoul Girardet (1987: 99) as stereotypes of the persecution of the crowd, they can be associated with the old Jewish practice of the "scapegoat". If in the Middle Ages in the role of "scapegoat" was distributed mainly in Jewish communities, and in modern times, the Masonic and Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracies, the genesis of the current pandemic is most often attributed to China. As an aspirant to the title of world economic leader, with a political regime separate from NATO member countries, he allegedly created the virus in a laboratory in Wuhan (Mediafax, 2020).

The impact of these stereotypes is enhanced by the popularity and/or status of peddlers. The theories of a former Italian minister about pandemic programming (Mediafax, 2020) or the "information" posted on Instagram by singer Madonna or Donald Trump (then US president) that a vaccine for Covid-19 has been discovered but is distributed only to some elites, they went around the planet (Digi24, 2020).

#### **Conclusions.**

1. The pandemic is the source of a major, unscheduled and sustainable social change, which has led to a number of anomic phenomena. Measuring their intensity and directions of manifestation exceeds the scope of a theoretical presentation.

2. Despite the avalanche of information, functional cognitive biases throughout the history of human communities are accentuated by the strength and extension of virtual communication technologies.

3. Instruments for measuring accesses and adhesions in virtual communication make it difficult to differentiate between information with the potential for scientific truth and the Doxa (opinion) of political figures, media stars, and various picturesque characters.

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# POLITICAL POSITIONING INTERFERES IN SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PREVENTIVE PRACTICES OF ELDERLY FEMALES IN COPING WITH COVID-19 IN BRAZIL

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**Introduction.** According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2020), the world is experiencing a global pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) and the disease called Covid-19. The most common symptoms listed in the literature are fever above 37°C, coughing, breathing difficulties, muscular and articulation pain, pain in the throat and headaches, nauseas, decrease in taste and smell capacity, and others. Advanced stages of the disease may lead towards a serious pneumonia, acute breathing syndrome, septic shock, and death. However, several infected people may be asymptomatic or develop similar symptoms similar to the common flu.

The most vulnerable groups to the above symptoms are risk groups, among whom may be listed people suffering from hypertension, cardiovascular disease, cerebralvascular disease and elderly people, or rather over seventy-year-old people (Liu, Chen, Lin, & Han, 2020). Since no cure or vaccine are extant at present, social distancing, something which lies in the interface between individual and social behavior, hedged by group belonging, is the sole prevention. Consequently, the current study is greatly interesting for Social Psychology.

Although the disease in Brazil has made great strides, with enormous social media coverage on the number of infected people and death tallies, many people are not following social distancing properly. Several aspects interfere in the people's risk perception which may be divided into socio-demographic and psycho-social variables. Several studies have indicated that risk perception is higher among females when compared to that in males (Chauvin & Herman, 2006; Lima et. al., 2020).

In the case of coronavirus, a study by Plohl and Musil (2020) has underscored several aspects related to the prevention of contamination, such as political conditioning, religion, conspiracy theory, trust in science, risk perception to Covid-19 and conformity to prevention norms suggested by the health authorities. The advance of the pandemic and the increase in the number of confirmed infections and deaths by Covid-19 have caused feeling of anxiety, uncertainty of the future, angst, panic, not only in Brazil but worldwide.

It is a relevant theoretical presupposition in the current study to take into account that prevention behavior concerning certain diseases may be affected by behavioral attitudes and by the system of values related to the social and cultural dimension. Human behavior is molded within a network of symbolic associations constructed throughout history. These types of behavior and their meanings are transmitted to people through their reference groups. Consequently, so that the aspects involved in the prevention behavior to Covid-19 may be understood, the use of theoretical presuppositions is necessary since it would help to comprehend several influence factors and behavior adhesion. The Theory of Social Representations may be highly promising for such understanding.

**Aim.** The current study investigates psycho-social aspects related to prevention behavior and Social Representations (SR) of Covid-19 for elderly females through an online questionnaire shared by WhatsApp application.

**Method.** Research has been authorized by the Committee for Ethics in Research on Human Beings of the UFSC, under protocol 4.061.146. The questionnaire, featuring open and closed items, comprised 21 questions with the following topics: a) sociodemographic data; b) Social Representations on Covid-19; c) political stance; d) beliefs and knowledge on disease; d) prevention behavior; e) health specificities; f) information sources; g) risk perception. A 20-elderly people pilot group was formed and then the online questionnaire was provided. Descriptive and relational statistical analysis was undertaken with closed questions by SPSS 17.0, and a question with free answer on Covid-19 was analyzed by IRaMuTeQ.

**Results.** Three hundred and twenty-six females over 60 years old participated: 40.8 % were within the 60 - 64 years old group; 29.8 % were within the 65 - 70 years old group; 18.1 % were within the 70 - 74 years old group; 7.1 % were within the 75 - 79 years old group; 3.4 % were within the 80 - 84 years old group; 0.9 % were over 85 years old. Most participants (44 %) lived in the southwestern region of Brazil, followed by 33.75 % residents in the south region. Further, 12.80 % informed they resided in the northeastern region of Brazil; 7.5 % in the center-western region; 0.95 % in the northern region. Moreover, 37.7 % of participants had a higher education degree; 31.3 % had a postgraduate course; 13.8 % had incomplete high schooling; 10.1 % had incomplete higher education; 3.1 % had incomplete high schooling; 2.5 % had incomplete elementary schooling; 1.5 % had complete elementary schooling.

Regarding religion, 55.2 % said they were Catholics; 16.3 % said they were Spiritualists; 9.5 % professed other religions; 8.3 % said they did not have any religion; 5.8 % professed to be Protestants; 2.1 % said they were Agnostic; 1.8 % were Atheists; 0.9 % professed an Afro-Brazilian religion. In the case of the acquisition of new habits, 95.4 % stated that they changed their hygiene habits due to the disease. Participants believe that Covid-19 may kill, with very high averages on this point (M = 4.45; SD = 0.68) on the 5-point Likert-type scale. They were afraid of being infected (M = 4.26; SD = 0.90), and declared they have slightly risked themselves (M = 2.77; SD = 1.07). On their political stance, 34.4 % stated they were not interested in politics; 29.4 %

confessed they were right-winged; 26.7 % said they were leftist; 8 % stated they were at the center; 0.9 % said they were of the extreme left; 0.6 % said they were extreme right. Averages were compared by totaling left and extreme left and totaling right and extreme right.

Participants admitted they were only averagely informed on Covid-19 (M = 3.69; SD = 0.75). Right-winged participants believed more on the efficaciousness of hydroxychloroquine in the treatment of the disease (M = 4.28; SD = 0.89) than the leftist ones (M=1.51; SD = 0.64). Further, leftist participants believed more in the truth of information disseminated by the social media (M = 4.48; SD = 0.65) than the rightist participants (M = 3.52; SD = 1.04) and they have a greater trust in science and health experts, such as physicians (M = 4.48; SD = 0.65) than rightist ones (M = 3.52; SD = 1.04). Whereas rightist participants trust the president's discourse on Covid-19 (M = 3.84; SD = 1.16) than leftist ones (M = 1.01; SD = 0.10) with a greater belief that viruses and diseases may have been manufactured by organizations and countries (M = 3.21; SD = 1.31) than leftist participants (M = 1.54; SD = 0.96). The rightist group is therefore more prone to believe in the conspiracy theory.

With regard to the Social Representations on Covid-19, in general, the prototype analysis gives rise to a possible central nucleus around such items as fear, distancing, pain and danger. When political stance is placed as a variable, the most associated elements linked to leftist participants were distancing, risk and quarantine, whereas for the rightist group the elements death, pain and party-police were predominant.

**Conclusions.** Deep political polarization on the Covid-19 theme has been detected among the participants. In fact, political stance determined a set of psychosocial aspects that affected preventive practices in the wake of the disease, such as the belief in hydroxychloroquine, information by the media, by expects and by the president, coupled to a high degree of conspiracy theory among the rightist group. Results indicate specificities among the participating groups within different political positioning. It is mandatory to take into account the pertaining characteristics of the social groups for the dissemination of practices for the control of the pandemic. It

should also be underscored that, since social representations are associated with the cultural, social and political emergency matrix, its theorization proves to be congruent through an interpretation critique. Consequently, understanding how much a pertaining group may affect the reception of information on the disease and its prevention practices and control should be the objects of further in-depth studies.

### MEDIA CONSUMPTION AND EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE IN DEALING WITH COVID-19 PANDEMIC IN SERBIA

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**Introduction**. Across the globe, societal reactions to the on-going Covid-19 pandemic revealed a close interaction between politics and the ability of societies to effectively deal with the pandemic. On the one side, political factors affected perceptions and preferred policies regarding the pandemic, while on the other side, the pandemic – the threat posed by it, restrictions, controversies – have affected political processes, and individual political attitudes and evaluations.

In this interaction between government actions and citizens' political attitudes, mass media are likely to play an important role. Normatively, the main role of the media is to transfer important information to the public in an objective and unbiased manner. It is, however, well known that this ideal image does not always fit the reality and that media are sometimes politically and ideologically biased.

It is known from the literature that politically biased media may affect citizen's attitudes, whether directly or through the so-called agenda-setting mechanism (Druckman & Parkin, 2005; Weaver, 2007). But, it is also documented that citizens select media outlets according to their preexisting political orientations (Barnidge et al., 2020). Thus, what may sometimes appear as the biasing effect of the media, may simply be evidence of selective media consumption on the part of the consumers.

Since the Serbian media supply is strongly politically colored, Serbia represents a favorable case to study the role of politicized media consumption in connection with the evaluation of government performance concerning handling the Covid-19 crisis. [Note that Serbia is ranked 93<sup>rd</sup> in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index, preceded by Moldova and North Macedonia, and followed by Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Ukraine (source: https://rsf.org/en/ranking).] In this paper, we ask the question: Is selective media consumption associated with the evaluation of the Serbian government's performance concerning its handling of the Covid-19 health crisis? We answer this question with the help of survey data, collected in Serbia during the current Covid-19 epidemics.

**Objectives**. The main objective of this analysis is to examine the associations between specific media consumption patterns, and government evaluation concerning its performance vis-a-vis the Covid-19 pandemic. Evaluation of government performance tends to be politically motivated: governments led by preferred parties are generally evaluated more positively compared to governments headed by parties we dislike. At the same time, the consumption of specific media outlets can be based on similar political motives. Hence, we hypothesize:

1. Consumption of media outlets favorable towards government parties should be associated with more positive government evaluations.

2. Consumption of media outlets favorable towards the opposition parties should be associated with more negative evaluations.

The expectations about the effects of the consumption of politically neutral media outlets (those outlets that cannot be *a priori* classified as a pro or contra government, such as personal internet search, foreign media) are less clear. On the one hand, there may be no systematic association, since the media content reached in that manner could equally be favorable as unfavorable towards the government. However, the overall associations could resemble what is described under hypothesis 2, because the non-consumption of government-biased media could already indicate an underlying political leaning. Perhaps more importantly, such information sources may provide

more diverse, and perhaps more objective, information content compared to the content of the pro-government inclined media.

We focus on two groups of variables. One is represented by items operationalizing the evaluation of government performance concerning its handling of the Covid-19 crisis. Given the massive disruption of social life caused by the pandemic and the fact that societal reactions have been coordinated mainly through government actions, we expected that evaluations of government performance are likely to be influenced not just by one's personal experiences, but also by information delivered through the main media channels. Since the Serbian media tend to be politically colored, preference for certain media outlets is likely to be associated with the way the government's handling of the health crisis is perceived.

Hence, the second group of variables concerns the media consumption, which is the choice of the main media outlets that respondent has consumed in the recent period. The main media outlets in Serbia are heavily politically biased. The majority of the media, in particular, all TV networks with channels broadcasted nationally, including the Serbian public service broadcaster TV (Radio and Television of Serbia, RTS), can easily be classified as favorable towards the governing parties (in fact, the main government party Serbian Progressive Party, SNS). Nevertheless, there are several vigorously active opposition-supportive media, but somewhat less accessible to the wider public (e.g., those without a cable TV subscription, or internet access). We also asked about using individual internet searches as the main source of information, as well as the consumption of foreign media. The designation of the relevant media in these categories is presented in Table 1.

Based on the literature on the media effects on political preferences, we developed the following theoretical argument that underlies the presented analysis. Political preferences are hard to change and have already been set before the offset of the pandemic. Hence, the subsequent events are likely to have been seen and interpreted through the politically and ideologically colored prism. Supporters of the government parties are likely to approve the government's handling of the crisis, while the opposition supporters are likely to be more critical. In brief, as the literature suggests, new events tend to be interpreted according to the preexisting schemes. Moreover, it is also known that individuals select media outlets they consume based on preferences that just reinforce them. Media that are likely to express contrary opinions are typically avoided, ignored, or otherwise discounted.

Hence, the choice of media outlets, according to our hypothesis, will predict government evaluation, because media have been politically aligned already before the pandemic. The opposition negatively evaluates government and consumes the opposition media, while incumbent government voters consume pro-government media, and evaluate government positively.

**Method and procedure**. This study is based on a public opinion survey, conducted in Serbia mainly between July 20th and September 10th, 2020. It was an online survey, based on several modes of respondent recruitment. About two-thirds of the sample was recruited using email addresses gathered from publicly accessible websites in the Serbian Internet domain. The remaining respondents were invited using various means of Internet advertising – in Serbian media, via Facebook, Google, and similar. It is a sample of convenience, but it has good coverage of the national territory (almost all municipalities are represented), and it is diverse in the main sociodemographic characteristics (age, education, occupation).

Assessment of government performance concerning Covid-19 was measured by four bipolar scales: 0. Capable -10. Incapable, 0. Benevolent -10. Malicious, 0. Unjust -10. Just, 0. Clear -10. Confusing. Media outlet use was captured by asking respondents to mark up to 3 sources of information they follow most often in recent days. There were 11 entries, 7 of which could be categorized as favorable to the government, 2 as oppositional, and 2 as nominally neutral.

**Results.** Correlations between media outlets use and government evaluation along 4 dimensions are presented in Table 1. Although the table contains 44 correlation coefficients, the main results are simple to summarize. Preference for pro-government media outlets is associated with more positive government evaluation, on all four

dimensions. For instance, those who indicated the national public service broadcaster (RTS) as one of their most frequently consumed outlets are significantly more likely to characterize the government's handling the Covid crisis as "Just" (r = .30, p < .001).

	0.Capable –	0. Benevolent -	0. Unjust -	0. Clear -
	10. Incapable	10. Malicious	10. Just	10. Confusing
Pro-government media				
B92	094**	114**	.104**	080**
Blic	091**	110**	.114**	088**
Kurir, Informer, Alo	078**	120**	.128**	074**
Pink TV	233**	204**	.238**	250**
Prva TV	171**	160**	.184**	194**
RTS, national public TV & radio	271**	272**	.300**	247**
Happy TV & web portal	070**	069**	.071**	077**
Pro-opposition media				
TV N1	.219**	.203**	196**	.224**
Nova.rs web portal & TV	.239**	.233**	220**	.227**
Neutral media				
Own internet search	.082**	.094**	101**	.071**
Foreign media (via Internet or				
cable)	.120**	.124**	141**	.122**

Table 1: Correlations between media outlets use, and government evaluation dimensions

\**p* < .05, \*\**p* < .01.

According to hypothesis 2, reliance on the pro-opposition media is associated with more negative government evaluation. For instance, those relying on TV N1 are relatively more likely to see the government's policies as incapable, malicious, unjust, and confusing. Finally, it proved that the consumption of nominally neutral media sources (own internet search, foreign media) has a similar relationship with government evaluation, as the consumption of the pro-opposition media. However, the association concerning the 'neutral' media is overall somewhat weaker.

**Conclusions**. In an ideal democratic world, the evaluation of government performance should be based on unbiased information provided by objective media. The selection of specific media outlets should matter little concerning the quality of

policy-relevant information that reaches the average citizen. In such world, the above table would be mostly filled by insignificant coefficients. In reality, in this case, the Serbian reality, the situation is different.

The results demonstrated that preference for certain media outlets is associated with a more positive or negative evaluation of how the Serbian government has handled the Covid-19 crisis. We interpret these results as indicating that the preexisting political and ideological preferences are responsible for the observed associations. Political and ideological orientation affects one's media preference, as well as the attitude towards the governing (and opposition) parties. It is also possible that the content of the media influences the evaluations independently. For instance, being exposed to the content provided by the Serbian national public service broadcaster (RTS) may itself shape one's view of the government policies, regardless of the political orientation before the crisis. In reality, these channels of influence are likely to both contribute to the observed findings, although we propose that the role of preexisting orientation is more influential. However, to decisively test this interpretation remains a task for future research. The results emphasize the value of politically unbiased, trustful media.

### NEW MODES OF ACCULTURATION AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE DURING COVID-19 CRISIS

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**Introduction.** The Covid-19 crisis has brought swift and tremendous challenges and changes, and this experience is making us revisit the patterns of the contemporary political culture of citizens and explore the capability of basic democratic institutions to adapt, and to prove sustainable in the time of pandemic turmoil. The Covid-19 crisis management triggered new modes of social acculturation and the "health Enlightenment" of citizens. In parallel, new modes of institutional change and adaptation of democracy are invented. The analysis describes what new modes of acculturation can be observed among citizens, and finds out that parliaments are still preserving institutional capacities of performing their constitutional role in the decision-making process. Even with the lower turnout at the elections, that is held during the pandemic, elections are remaining the main realm and tool of citizens' participation in democracy.

**Objectives.** The objective of this analysis is to discuss how Covid-19 crisis management is changing our self-constructive patterns of the contemporary political world – our *Weltanschauung*. How we are changing our perception of citizen's role in democracy, and our readiness to defend our basic human rights and fundamental democratic institutions? It is obvious that responses, triggered by the Covid-19 crises, both by governments and citizens are not the very same in nature. In a time of crisis, like this, politicians are in charge of making the choices first. Harari rightly observes that politicians didn't have a "readymade blueprint for what to do, so they are therefore

singularly open to new ideas. Even to crazy ideas" (Harari, 2020). Or dangerous ones, to put it more preciously.

**Results.** Ordinary people were even more in doubt – they were aware that the pandemic will change something, but still hoping that it will not change everything in their life. The main symbol of this change became the most visible and obligatory – face-mask as the new symbol of a new pattern of the so-called "acculturation" phenomenon. The process of acculturation (originally described by Linton and Herskovits, 1938) occurs as a result of continuous and direct contact between the groups of individuals belonging to different cultures and leads to modification of the original cultural patterns of one, or of both of these groups. After the Covid-19 pandemic has been declared by the WHO – people started to learn, from a scratch, things that have already been invented and in massive practice, if not in their neighborhood, then on the other, distant part of the Globe – in Asia, starting from 2003, due to SARS epidemic, or a long time ago, during the Spanish flu epidemic, after the First World War.

New processes of adaptation and acculturation have been re-invented, and repeatedly popularized by mass media in all countries, around the world. New definitions of acceptable health and social behavior – social distancing, wearing of protective face-masks, limiting family and business contacts, online work from home, etc. resulted in the new gospel of "health Enlightenment". Governments started to expect from their entire population – nation to adopt and assimilate themselves to anti-Covid19 measures, and to integrate into "new normality". It should not be forgotten, that under "normal circumstances", the process of acculturation regularly occurs over a large span of time – throughout a few generations. Acculturation measures imposed by governments` strong hands – lockdowns, quarantines, even emergencies, occurred quite suddenly and rapidly – even with the use of physical force performed by army or police units on the streets. People were constantly exposed to the instructive but stressful state and media propaganda, which was intended to make them fear and obey. The new "health care order" has been legitimized through the legitimacy of the new

culture of fear and obedience (Keane, Podunavac, Sparks, 2008). Fear becomes the ultimate pattern of contemplating the future since we don't know how and when exactly the Covid-19 pandemic will end.

What this process of compulsory health-oriented acculturation is telling us, is that the basic, traditional Rousseau's social contract between citizens and rulers, is in the process of serious challenge and redefinition. According to Rousseau's vision of democracy, individual citizen (*citoyen*) is the creator of political statehood, he/she is not an obedient servant, but n actor of people's sovereignty (Vukomanovic, 2011). During the current Covid-19 pandemic, the sovereignty of citizens – their democratic, human rights have been significantly reduced, under the excuse that the entire political community has been threatened, and that everyone should obey new rules if the majority of the population is intended to survive Covid-19.

Not all citizens could conform to these new rules – there were numerous cases of dissent, rebellion, and even massive protests erupted on the streets of many cities, mainly in Europe and the USA, people were chanting anti-Covid-19 and anti-vaccine slogans. But, these street protests and social media conspiracy "theories" have no adequate social energy to be articulated and integrated on the mainstream political agenda – their advocates remain marginalized as fake news propagators.

While new health measures have been interpreted as a new mode of "health Enlightenment", democracy and human rights have been eclipsed by the Covid-19 crisis. The Covid-19 pandemic challenged the parliament with the question of whether this fundamental institution of democracy is capable to reassure its constitutional role and facilitate democratic governance continuity in the time of pandemic crisis. In theory, parliament is strong when any emergency government powers were both limited in time and scope, and subject to parliamentary oversight. But, how this works in practice, during the Covid-19 crisis?

IDEA's global mapping of parliaments' different responses to the coronavirus pandemic, comparing data from 166 parliaments around the world, from February to June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2020, established that more than half of parliaments around the world have

adequately responded to the Covid-19 challenge – 82 legislatures blueprinted plenary measures that can be categorized as adopting a change in procedures, such as reduced quorum (22 countries); hybrid – special procedures to allow virtual meetings of MPs (17); social distancing (16); remote work/vote (10); normal procedure (8); proxy vote (4); virtual meetings in different rooms (3); remote vote (1), and one suspended parliament that was not able to fulfill its constitutional duties. Approximately twelve percentage of parliaments (20 out of 166) continued to work according to normal procedure, as before the pandemic.

Two major lessons were learned, according to another IDEA's comprehensive analysis, which explored parliaments' role in reviewing how effectively the government responded to the crisis and disaster planning. The conclusion was that effective parliamentary engagement in governance during a crisis is not only essential for preserving democratic practices and institutions but is also necessary to ensure the best possible outcome in crisis management (Murphy, 2020).

On the other hand, it was paradoxically, that many of incumbent politicians who were keen to suspend parliaments, and to silent opposition, were still advocating to preserve "business as usual" state of affair regarding the question to hold or not to hold elections – hoping that their hardline approach during the pandemic will result in their post-pandemic victory.

According to IDEA's Global overview of Covid-19 impact on elections (IDEA, 2020), from late February to mid-September, 2020, more than 90 countries and territories across all the continents had to decide whether to hold or postpone national and sub-national elections, or referendums. Initially, 71 of them have decided to postpone national and subnational elections. Finally, approx. 60 countries and territories have decided to hold national or subnational elections despite concerns related to Covid-19, of which at least 45 have held national elections or referendums.

These numbers are proving us with the conclusion that politicians across the world have gone through an intensively calculated process of judgment if it is better to organize elections, even in the time of the pandemic, providing that health safety measures at polling stations are implemented than to postpone it. A positive conclusion from these data can be drawn that democracy matters, still! Elections are always the most trustworthy "litmus test" of how democracy is strong or weak – whether democracy is still "the only game in town" (Linz, Stepan, 1996). Nevertheless, many of the elections that were held during the spread of Covid-19 in 2020 saw turnout drops – data from a representative sample of 18 countries/territories, where parliamentary or presidential elections were held between January 1<sup>st</sup> and July 19<sup>th</sup>, 2020, show that the mean change in turnout was lower - 6.21 percentage points, comparing to previous elections (Toby, Alihodzic, 2020).

**Conclusion.** But, on the other hand, the readiness of ordinary people – citizens, and of many politicians also, to preserve and to invent new, or to modify existing democratic procedures, amidst the Covid-19 crisis, is more encouraging, than disappointing. As comparative data on parliaments and elections show, people are still able to put their health, even life, at risk to actively participate in parliamentary debates or elections, as well as in the street protests. And that is exactly how democratic order works and how democracy can survive this crisis. The most optimistic is the conclusion that during the Covid-19, all of us are becoming more passionate human rights activists and democracy defenders.

# FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE IN EASTERN EUROPE IN THE BEGINNING OF COVID-19 OUTBREAK

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**Introduction.** Since the Covid-19 outbreak occurred in Wuhan, China in December 2019 and became a worldwide pandemic in 2020, a number of countries have reported their experiences in mental health care and psychological support during different phases of coronavirus spread:

-emotional responses, psychological states, and psychopathological consequences of populations in China (Qiu J. et al., 2020; Wang C. et al., 2020; Duan L. & Zhu G., 2020) and Japan (Shigemura J. et al., 2020);

-psychological impact on medical staff and volunteers in China (Dai Y. et al., 2020; Huang Y. & Zhao N., 2020; Liu S. et al., 2020);

-specific stressors of quarantines and ways of stress-prevention (Brooks S. K. et al., 2020);

-strategies, new elaborations, difficulties and results of mental health care, psychological support, and crisis psychological interventions, especially on-line, in China (Xiang, Y.-T. et al., 2020; Liu S. et al., 2020; Xiao C., 2020; Zhang J.et al., 2020; Duan L. & Zhu G., 2020; Chen Q. et al., 2020), Korea (Park S.-C. & Park Y.-C., 2020), UK (Brooks S. K. et al., 2020), USA (Morganstein J., 2020) and Switzerland (Liebrenz M. et al., 2020).

However, reports of specialists themselves about their experience in psychological practice in the pandemic situation and observed psychotherapy phenomena have not been analyzed yet, which has been true also for financial changes in providing support in private.

**Objectives.** The aim of this report is to share the particular results of the study on Covid-19 pandemic effects on psychological support and psychotherapy in Eastern Europe (Velykodna & Frankova, 2020). These particular results are associated with financial aspects of current and anticipated changes in psychological practice which occurred after the first cases of coronavirus appeared in the region.

**Method and procedure.** To achieve the research goals an anonymous on-line survey for practitioners in psychology and psychotherapy was developed. In addition to some personal and general professional information (duration of experience, main method or approach of practice, usual format of working, etc.), there were open and closed questions on current and anticipated changes in psychological support and psychotherapy associated with the Covid-19 pandemic, including financial. On the top of the survey, a motivation note was written. During  $14^{th} - 16^{th}$  of March, 2020, the participants were asked via the Internet (e-mails, announcements on Facebook and closed professional web-pages) to fill in an online-form as anonymous. The participants of the survey were Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking practitioners in psychology and psychotherapy from several countries in Eastern Europe. Data analysis of the study is based on descriptive statistics, calculation of frequencies and percentages.

**Results.** Total 145 responses were received by the survey from 131 female (90.3 %) and 14 male (9.7 %) psychologists and psychotherapists. The duration of their experience in practice was from 1 to 27 years (approximate M = 8.1, SD = 6.02, Mo = 5, Me = 6). From the total sample 30.3 % of practitioners were affiliated in institutions, mental health centers or organizations and 77.9 % worked with patients in private practice. Consequently, 7.6 % worked in both spheres. Besides, 91.7 % of specialists marked they usually hold practice in person (42.1 % in person only) and 57.9 % told

they worked online (8.3 % online only). Those who worked mostly in person usually mentioned 1 country where their practice was located, however, on-line psychologists indicated a number of countries. Thus, overall we gathered a list with countries, where specialists' patients were from: Ukraine (71.0 %), Russian Federation (23.5 %), Poland (7.6 %), the USA (6.9 %), Italy and Germany (4.1 %), Belarus (2.8 %), Finland, Israel, the UK (2.1 %), Hungary, France, Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Peru, Turkey, Vietnam (0.7 %).

In relation to Covid-19 pandemic situation 46.2 % of them pointed out there had been no cases of Covid-19 yet in their region (city, town or state), while 37.9 % admitted there had been cases of novel coronavirus in the region (11.0 % also mentioned death cases). Additionally, 15.9 % of survey participants stated they were not informed about the situation with the Covid-19 pandemic in the region. Only 35.9 % of psychologists and psychotherapists admitted that they had already observed or initiated some changes in the content or setting of their work by the time the survey took place.

Financial aspects of psychological practice in the beginning of the Covid-19 outbreak were mentioned in the responses of some specialists in two blocks of questions. The first of them was connected to the current perceived changes in work with clients and was formulated as an open question. It is important to consider that this question had not directed participants to refer to any financial issues. The second block was devoted to anticipating changes in practice that would be acceptable for psychologists and psychotherapists themselves.

In the first block, the topic of finances appeared in the context of limitations to continue the work with some individuals. Due to the danger of infection with Covid-19, during the observed period some psychologists, psychotherapists, or their patients canceled meetings in person: consultations, individual and group therapy sessions, psychological classes with children and some public projects. In most cases, it was possible to continue consultations or therapy sessions online. However, for some individuals it was impossible to participate in online sessions for different reasons: lack

of space at home, where other family members were present; limitations of the method to be conducted online, etc.

Consequently, the work with them was suspended for the quarantine duration. What was also noticed by specialists is that some patients could not continue to get psychological support even in their usual online format because of financial difficulties. The reason was that the quarantine, as well as the worldwide economic impact of Covid-19, had reduced the patient's usual income. We suppose this fact is somehow connected to the other type of answers to this question, where an emphasis on urgency as a new characteristic of requests was made. Psychologists and psychotherapists had noticed an increase in the amount of «urgent» consultations with new, current and past patients. If the financial impact is significant for these patients, then they may ask for psychological support in literally urgent cases only. However, this hypothesis needs further study.

In the second block, devoted to anticipating changes in practice in case if the situation with Covid-19 in the region would worsen, 35.9 % of the total amount of practitioners answered they would accept a delay in payment for sessions and consultations if needed. Moreover, 17.2 % of respondents accepted they were ready to decrease temporarily their standard fees for psychological support and psychotherapy. The group of 22.1 % of survey participants mentioned that the charitable format of consultations and psychotherapy sessions with some individuals in need was acceptable. Interestingly, 9 % of specialists agreed to try an exchange of consultations for certain patient's goods or services instead of a fee. We may summarize that all mentioned anticipated practices are aimed at continuing the work with patients in the situation if regular payment is temporarily impossible.

**Conclusions.** The study on financial aspects of the first Covid-19 pandemic effects on psychological support and psychotherapy in Eastern Europe made by analysis of practitioners' responses on developed online survey showed two tendencies:

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1. Financial effects of quarantine or worldwide economic changes because of novel coronavirus on patients had become a reason for pauses or interruptions of psychotherapy and psychological support on a par with the danger of meetings in person. The correlation between mentioned financial difficulties and transformation of requests into urgent may be supposed and should be studied separately.

2. Practitioners in psychology and psychotherapy were prone to change somehow the financial side of relations with patients to save the process in distant format (online or by telephone) if possible, in case the situation with Covid-19 in the region would worsen. Delay in payment was the most acceptable option for the specialists. However, consultations for free with some individuals in need or temporarily decrease of regular fees were also marked as possible.

Due to the rapid spread of Covid-19 and its obvious impact on world economics in general and Eastern Europe in particular, we suppose that further changes in financial aspects of psychological practice are expected.

# POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY

# THE IMAGE OF A VILLAGER IN THE NARRATION OF THE DEPORTEES FROM MOLDAVIAN RSS

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**Introduction.** Social traumas such as deportations, fall into the category of manmade disasters, in which an individual or a group is subjected to trauma by the impact of other human individuals, this way overcoming the psychic resonance associated with natural or technical trauma. Bohleber (2007) mentions that the aim of the anthropogenic traumas is to annihilate the historical and social existence of the person, a central psychological consequence of this type of experience being the collapse of the empathy process, this way testing the social connection.

The psychoanalytic perspective formulates important hypotheses regarding the mechanisms of the individual's involvement as a traumatogenic character in the context of social traumas. In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921)*, Freud mentions the idealization of a leader and his own group and external projection of negative features. In *Civilization and Its Discontents (1930)*, Freud is firm in his hypothesis about the human tendency to aggression and considers it to be the main disruptive factor of relationships with people around us, an important role of civilization and culture being to limit instinctual impulses in order to maintain group cohesion.

Melanie Klein (1946) continues the analysis of the psychic mechanisms that predispose to heterodestructivity, mentioning the role of envy and schizoparanoid mechanisms in the beginning of psychic life. According to Klein's opinion, the first months of life are dominated by archaic schizoparanoid psychic mechanisms, characterised by communication through projective identification, splitting, idealization, devaluation, as well as the prevalence of persecutory anxiety, archaic forms of envy and rivalry. In the process of mental growth, the next position, more evolved, will be the depressive position, in which an individual is able to contain aggressive impulses, where the prevalent anxiety is depressive, related to awareness of attachment to the Other, of the possibility of losing the Other as a result of one's aggressive movements. In the depressive position the person is able to experience feelings of guilt, which stimulates the reparative gesture.

Paolo Fonda (2017) extrapolates the Kleinian psychic positions – schizoparanoid and depressive – on the functioning of the group, suggesting that not only individuals but also groups move from one position to another, regressing to the schizoparanoid position every time they cannot maintain the depressive position, due to an internal vulnerabilities or due to external factors. The intensification of the schizoparanoid position will determine the creation of a common enemy, the devaluation and dehumanization of the enemy and the idealization of one's own group. Fonda mentions low availability of an individual and a group to recognize their own destructive tendencies, because this puts in contact with painful realities specific to the depressive position – awareness of their own destructiveness, grief of loss, guilt, consciousness of human condition.

The psychoanalytic perspective reveals that development and maintenance of a healthy relationship with others requires a continuous effort in maintaining the depressive position, moments of socio-political chaos updating and manipulating archaic feelings that are difficult to manage. The accentuation of social animosities and the splitting of the community represent stratagems characteristic for totalitarian systems, including the communist repressive system. The deportations from the Moldavian SSR during 1940 - 1941, 1944 - 1953 were subjected to the same "logistical" schemes of splitting the community, especially by qualifying the deportees in the official argumentative discourses of repression as dangerous elements, ones being called *enemies of the nation* and, at the same time, including the villagers in the deportation teams.

The **objective** of the research: the analysis of the image of a villager in the narration of the deportees.

**Method** of data analysis used is content analysis. The narrative material was obtained and based on the in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted by Institute of Social History "ProMemoria" within the State Program "Recovery and Historical Valorification of the Memory of Victims of the Totalitarian-Communist Regime of the Moldovian SSR during 1940 – 1941, 1944 – 1953".

**Results.** Following the analysis of the interviews conducted with the former deportees, we identify a differentiation in the group of deportees regarding the role of a villager in the context of deportations. We identified a category of deportees who attribute responsibility for deportations to the Stalinist repressive regime, and less or not at all to individuals or specific social categories: "The communist regime is guilty of everything that happened ...". For another category of deportees, compatriots are associated with responsibility and guilt for deportations and are often the target for anger and hatred: "Then why did they deport us? The pagans from the village wanted that".

In the speech of the deportees, attitudes and actions of the villagers perceived as relational traumas, are related to: 1) lack of empathy and compassion for deportees ("That one from the village didn't allow us even to take a bread with us: 'Leave it, you don't need it, they will take you there, to the white bears, and the bears will feed you, the white bears will eat you'"); 2) the suffering derived from the betrayal from villagers side ("Vasile Ciocan ate with us, drank with us, but he didn't give up until he didn't

take my father out of the house"); 3) situations of gross manifestation of social envy ("You deserve it, you have been raised by them, now you will be poor too...").

It is important to mention the tendency towards generalization, as a manifestation of mental splitting and a form of cognitive distortion, through which negative traits are attributed to the whole nation, along with the idealization of other ethnicities and nations: Kazak would never sell you! And, look, how the Moldavians treated us!"; "Moldavians are envious.". Thus trend identified in the interviews is the description of Moldavians as envious, evil, traitors. We consider this tendency to generalization, a consequence of the incapacity to elaborate the trauma and a proof of a maintenance of splitting position in the interpretation of the social realities.

When asked if they have forgiven those considered involved in deportations, the deportees respond in a way that led us to use the expression *resentful forgiveness*. When we say resentful forgiveness, we differentiate deportees that send messages of forgiveness from their side as a human instance, but this forgiveness does not seem to be final, as most of them tend to appeal to another judge – Fate, Divinity, which will punish those who contributed to the repression: "I forgave them, but God will punish them anyway" is the type of message that represents this attitude.

**Conclusions.** Deportations represent a trauma in which a significant share has relational traumatisation. We find in the context of deportations, as in other social traumas, presence of psychic mechanism of splitting, through which the world is divided into "good" and "bad". Through this categorical division of realities, splitting is involved in social violence and allows actualization and maintaining of schizoparanoid mecanisms and primitive feelings of hatred, envy, rivalry, while at the same time impeding the elaboration of trauma.

We find that in the testimonies of the deportees that Stalin, the Communist Party and some villagers are appointed responsible for the deportations. But the villagers have a specific status in the psychic representation regarding the responsibility for deportation of the deportees – a villager is often presented as a central character in deportation, being assigned with the intention and responsibility, also being experienced a range of post-traumatic reactions towards them – anger, hatred, disregard, etc.

In an attempt to provide pertinent assumptions for understanding this representation, we consider that a villager was the most accessible protagonist regarding deportations to which anger was directed, in contrast to the real perpetrators, at the same time inaccessible to the trauma elaboration procedure – Stalin and the Communist repressive system. This interpretation of the results is related to the specifics of social traumas and the fact that overcoming social trauma involves certain conditions: recognition of guilt, repairing, demands for punishment, recognition of the representatives of totalitarian system of the collapse of their value system (Fischer şi Riedesser, 1998). Given the fact that the Communist repressive system and its leaders were not subjected to a plenary trial and did not admit their guilt, the protagonist in relation to whom the most intense attitude of anger, as natural reaction of a traumatized person, remains the villager.

Reflections on the relationship with the Other are an important part of the manifestation of mourning, of the process of elaboration of trauma and of the process of reconciliation. In our approach we start from the premise that the lack of discussions about deportations has affected the entire population of the Republic of Moldova – both deportees and people involved in assisting the repressive system, as well as the rest of the population affected by Soviet propaganda in their ability to mentalise these events.

### CORRUPTION AND RULE OF LAW: PROBLEM OF INTERCONNECTION

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**Introduction**. Corruption has always been intrinsic to all types of economy, though the most developed countries had the smallest level of corruption and this rule worked opposite. But recently, the scope of the problem has increased and changed sharply around the world. This negative phenomenon in a long run is absorbing almost all executive branches.

Corruption is a multidisciplinary phenomenon that scholars from different disciplines have analyzed for a long period of time. There are corruption studies in law (Mijares, 2015; Peters, 2018), finance (Pantzalis, Park, Sutton, 2008; Warren, 2019; Rose-Ackerman, 2002; Ahmad, Ali, 2010; Bahoo, 2020), economics (Brada, Drabek, Perez, 2012; He, Xie, Zhu, 2015; Dlugopolskyi, Zhukovska, 2010; Everett, Neu, Rahaman, 2006; Boräng, Jagers, Povitkina, 2017), international business (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Bahoo, Alon, Paltrinieri, 2020; Pantzalis, Chul, Sutton, 2008) and environment (Povitkina, 2015; Koziuk, Dluhopolskyi, Hayda, Klapkiv, 2019). However, all these manifestations of corruption are somehow related to the quality of institutions and rule of law.

The **objective** of the paper is to test three key hypotheses:

1) there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the Corruption Perceptions Index and Rule of Law Index;

2) there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the Global Corruption Index and Rule of Law Index; 3) there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the Environmental, Social and Governance Index and Rule of Law Index.

**Methods and procedure.** The theoretical approaches in studying the influence of the rule of law on different social and juridical spheres were indicated in many scientific types of research. Rule of law and corruption are intrinsically related. The researches assuming that a weak rule of law implies a high level of corruption is supported by N. Leff, S. Huntington, B. White, A. Elbasani, S. Sabic. Many scientists (S. Stewart, N. Subedi, A. Lopez-Claros, V. Tanzi, O. Dluhopolskyi, H. Yu, A. Guernsey, C. Pring, J. Vrushi, A. Zhukovska) are studying the meaning of the rule of law as a separate process as well as in context of corruption. Scientists and researchers of international organizations (A. Peters, S. Rose-Ackerman, T. Corothers) also make massive contributions to methodology developments related to the question of how to overcome corruption according to the main principles of the rule of law.

The study used correlation and regression analysis tools using the application statistical software EXCEL. The purpose of the article consists of recommendations on how to keep the basic principles of the rule of law in the process of struggle against corruption based on the analysis. Theoretical and methodological research is fundamental in regularities cognition of principles in corruption struggle and some general scientific and specific methods that allow investigating in detail the meaning of the rule of law. In the process of research, the following methodological methods were used: scientific abstraction – for the formulation of theoretical generalizations and conclusions regarding the rule of law; analysis and synthesis – for studying the nature of corruption, the establishment of trends in corruption regularities; economic-statistical analysis – for grouping of reporting and previous data concerning the corruption in the world (list of 115 countries), construction of correlations between indicators of corruption (CPI, GCI, ESGI) and Rule of Law Index. All indexes were taken from open databases.

**Results.** Corruption has a direct influence on the infringement of the rule of law. Black's law dictionary gives a further explanation of corruption: "The act of doing something with the intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others" (Black's Law Dictionary, 2019). Corruption could be defined as a global phenomenon, but it does not affect all countries in the same way. It relates to human rights and human wealth. According to the economic theory, two basic points of corruption have been developed, one opinion tells us that corruption is exogenous and the other one – endogenous to the political process.

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures "the perceived levels of public sector corruption worldwide based on expert opinion from around the world" (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2019). The CPI uses a scale of zero (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). According to 180 countries that were included in the 2019 CPI report, countries with the richest income have the lowest level of corruption and vice versa. Rule of Law Index (ROL Index) measures adherence to the rule of law by looking at policy outcomes, such as whether people have access to courts or whether the crime is effectively controlled. The four universal principles of rule of law (accountability, just laws, open government, accessible and impartial dispute resolution) are further developed in the following eight factors of the ROL Index: constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice (Rule of Law Index, 2020). The regression between levels of CPI and ROL Index demonstrates, that the link between these indicators is direct and extraordinarily strong ( $R^2 = 0.9155$ , y = 124,14x - 24,237). This means that in countries with strict rules of law, tolerance of corrupt behavior among the population is minimal.

Another indicator of corruption – The Global Corruption Index (GCI) – is composed of 28 variables constructed based on datasets that are exclusively borrowed from internationally recognized entities. Encompassing as much as 198 countries, the GCI stands out for its global approach. Its results display the corruption risk exposure deriving from both the public and private sectors. The GCI also includes issues related to white-collar crimes and more specifically to money-laundering and terrorism financing (The Global Corruption Index, 2019). The regression between levels of GCI and ROL Index demonstrates, that the link between these indicators is indirect and extraordinarily strong ( $R^2 = 0.9294$ , y = -0.0085x + 0.9527). This means that in countries with strict rule of law, the risk of corruption among private and public sector institutions is minimal.

The ESG Index (Environmental, Social and Governance Index) is a tool that encompasses three major issues in risk analysis: environment (30%), human rights (50%), health & safety (20%) (ESG Index, 2019). With global coverage of 176 countries and territories, the ESG Index is dedicated to measuring risks based on 44 variables. Country results are presented on a 0 - 100 scale, where 0 corresponds to the lowest risk and 100 corresponds to the highest risk. The regression between levels of ESG Index and ROL Index demonstrates, that the link between these indicators is indirect and strong ( $R^2 = 0,7209$ , y = -93,137x + 94,166). This means that in countries with strict rule of law, key human rights, the environment, health & safety are protected.

**Conclusions.** Summarizing the problem of relationship between corruption and rule of law in the countries, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The direct link between ROL Index and CPI is confirmed empirically.

2. The indirect link between ROL Index and GCI, ESG Index is confirmed.

3. The rule of law is a more theoretical than practical approach to forming law regulation in each country. It shows the influence of law in society. A country with a high level of corruption cannot have a status where the rule of law is a priority.

4. Corruption does not necessarily involve the transfer of money or gifts, but it always presses abuse of official position in personal interests. The important factor in preventing corruption is improving activities on the social level. More attention should be paid to the messages from citizens, the media, results of sociological research on corruption acts, and other unlawful actions of officials.

### SIMULACRIZATION OF POLITICAL SUBJECTS

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**Introduction.** The technological development of the world has led to the transformation of relations between politicians and voters. More and more candidates are using social networks, mobile applications, and even video games to advertise their campaigns. Such features of communication, on the one hand, "separate" political leaders from their supporters, bringing the screen between (TV, mobile phone, etc.) and on the other – political information is spread around the world in minutes and every potential political follower has access to it.

New technologies have a significant impact not only on communication between political leaders and their electorate but also on the politics themselves. Because both technologies – Television and Digital – can adjust images, make appropriate color and sound accents, apply filters, create the illusion of the presence of a political leader in every home through parasociality, and so on. All these technological possibilities distort the image of the political candidate himself/herself and he/she appears to the audience in an "improved form", selling himself/herself as marketers sell expensive branded goods.

**Objectives.** The purpose of the article is to present the author's model, designed to show the changes that have taken place with political actors with the development of new technologies.

**Results.** In this authorial model, I insist on the postulate that politics with the involvement of new technologies in their political campaigns are simulated and lose to some extent their human roots. This happens because voters do not have direct access to political candidates, and interact with them only through screens. In order to

illustrate this main postulate, we are ready to present our model in the form of an axis of simularization of political subjects (See Fig. 1).




Figure 1. Simularization of political actors

As you can see in the picture, there are five types of simulated political actors. Let's look at each of them in detail.

*Real.* This political actor communicates with voters directly, face to face. This type of political interaction can be called the first. It originates from the primitive tribes and lasted until the beginning of the XVII century. A real political actor participated in open political discussions (Ancient Greece), delivered speeches (Ancient Rome), had specially trained people (heralds), official representatives who announced the people's will, new government decrees, etc. (Middle Ages).

*Media.* When the media appeared, the interaction between the people and political leaders transformed. The press has become not only a tool for conveying political thought to the general population but also an indirect, filter and independent source of creation and interpretation of political information.

After the invention of the radio and television, it became possible to create certain illusions about the image of a politician. For example, the first-ever televised debate between Vice President Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy, which took place on September 26<sup>th</sup>, 1960 in the United States. At the time, most American families had televisions, and the debate was watched by about 66 million Americans. In fact, this was the first time that so many voters saw both candidates so close. The example of

this debate showed that "the picture" for the audience is as important as the words of the candidates. Richard Nixon refused from the services of a studio make-up artist and during the live broadcast the audience saw drops of sweat running down the candidate's face and this was interpreted by voters as a manifestation of the candidate's nervousness and weakness. Later it lowered his rating. Another example is the story of the battle of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter for the presidency of the United States in 1976. Jimmy Carter received 50 % of the vote in the election, while Gerald Ford received only 48 %. There is a version that the mood of the voters was influenced by the comedy show Saturday Night Live, in which comedian Chevy Chase parodied Gerald Ford, portraying him as a clumsy politician who constantly stumbles over something and always confuses everything.

As we see, the images of politicians presented in the media can both help candidates win a political campaign and lose it. Most voters have never seen politicians alive, only on television screens, which is why political PR now has a clear media focus. The images of the candidates are balanced and exhausted. Their media images are created in such way that the candidates are liked by the voters, so that people believe their word.

*Surrogate*. After the undeniable advantages of the media were mastered, a new category of people in politics appeared in the world. In my opinion, these new people, surrogate politicians, can present to the public in different embodiments. The first ones are called "political actors" and this definition is not a collective concept of a politician, it is a definition of people who build their rating, turning politics into a show. They know how to dress to look good on camera, they know what to say in order for voters to like their words, they often use populist slogans and do not necessarily keep their word. So surrogate politicians raise acute issues to win supporters, they use expressive vocabulary, shock the public with statements and actively participate in the sociopolitical life of the country. But for them, politics is not a way to improve the lives of millions of people, but a way to make a profit. Just like real actors play roles in cinema, political actors play their own roles in the political arena. The second is public people

(actors, singers, show men, etc.) who have decided to change their activities and try themselves at politics. Such people already have their target audience and supporters, often not only within their country but also around the world. Such media personalities have parasocial relations with their followers. People perceive such media personalities as someone they know closely and when such media personality goes into politics, voters do not vote for a specific political program, but simply for a public figure they like. As an example, this may be Vitali Klitschko, a former boxer and now mayor of the capital of Ukraine.

*Digital.* These subjects of the political sphere are inherent to our present. Digitalization, which became the basis for the formation of digital political images, is the process of implementing digital technologies in all spheres of life. The transition of activities from the real world to the virtual world (online). In my opinion, the digital technologies that provide this process are the Internet of Things, robotics and cybersystems, artificial intelligence, additive technologies (3D printing), biometrics, technologies of identification, etc. These technologies make it possible to "digitize" the individual, to create its digital counterpart in the virtual world.

Parasociality, as a phenomenon, appears at the stage of media political subjects. But with the development of information technology, we can already talk about the creation of a "virtual" political subject that is different from the media embodiment. Hence, people no longer see the "clear picture". In digital format, they see a flat image and fantasize about everything else. The digital political subject is fundamentally "detached" (separated) from the real prototype. It is no longer just a simulacrum, the "separation effect" creates a kind of reality where the digital parasocial subject can form an attractive context around himself/herself, create an entourage, influence people's emotional state and actions, determine their motivation, and so on. As an example, the official page of a politician in a certain social network is not always maintained by him, it can be done by specially trained people (account managers etc.), and voters understand this and subconsciously doubt, asking "Am I really following the person to whom my message is directed?". In this regard, it is possible to trace the global trend, when the electorate rather forms parasocial relations and votes for political candidates who demonstrate their "humanity" in social networks. For example, on the pages in social networks of Justin Trudeau, Emmanuel Macron, or Donald Trump, they use a specific style of publication, revealing the personal side of life, creating a feeling of "liveliness" and uniqueness in followers.

*Virtual.* The next type of political subjects, according to my forecast, will be seen in the near future. When I describe the virtual subjects of political communication, I mean a new evolutionary round of technological development, when virtual simulacra will no longer have real analogs. And a striking example of this is the project "Neon" presented by Samsung in 2020, in which artificial intelligence produces avatars – human simulacra, without a primary analog. That is, artificial intelligence can develop a "digital person" who does not exist in the real world, choose the color of her hair, eyes, skin, make her interesting and attractive to other people. Samsung claimed it plans to sell such avatars to the film industry in the future, where they will act like actors. But we can easily imagine how such digital beings will be involved in the media industry and take the place of a host of programs or news, and in education – in distance learning of children, and in politics, where they will lobby someone's interests, act as real political leaders.

**Conclusions**. As we can see political actors are changing over time as well as the development of new technologies. It is easy to imagine a virtual politician that will become the president of some country and will govern society in terms of logic and law, without variation on corruption schemes and the "human factor".

## DEMOCRATIZATION AND DOMINANT VALUES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SOCIETY. POLITICAL LIBERALISM VS. AUTHORITARIAN COLLECTIVISM.

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**Introduction.** In the last three decades in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there have been dramatic social changes that are reflected in the decay of socialism, the degradation of the joint state, tragic ethnic conflicts, and the process of social transformation to a market economy and political pluralism. These processes have led to the fact that today's Bosnia and Herzegovina society, in many respects, is substantially different than what it was at the end of the eighties. Social changes that have taken place in this period can be seen as mutually interlocked operations of system changes and modernization.

Systemic change involves a change in the mode of production of social life, or change of the established social relations between classes, with which thereby the basis upon which the class relations exist and the manner of constituting the classes themselves is changed. Unlike socialism, where there was no separation between the economic, political and cultural subsystems and which were managed from one (party) center by a single ruling class (political and economic managers), capitalism leads to their separation and management from various centers. Thus, from a single ruling class, in the process of social transformation, three groups stand out: economic, political, and cultural elite, from which gradually the ruling capitalist class is constituted. In other parts of the social structure, significant changes occur.

In addition to changes in class-layered structure, the post-socialist transformation has brought a number of other changes in post-socialist societies. This is primarily related to changes in social mobility (there is a growth of self-reproduction of class), then changes in economic inequalities (data show that they are increasing) and changes in the value of basic forms of the social classes and strata. The volume and dynamics of these processes differ from one to the other.

The relationship between the normative system (which regulates the functioning of the social order) and the dominant value system (which directs the individual and collective action in the desired direction) is explained by using the theory of value-normative dissonance by Mladen Lazić (2011). In a situation of stable reproduction of social order, social action takes place in accordance with the dominant values, which are determined by the prevailing system of social relations and historical factors of a "long duration" (tradition, culture, etc.).

In this situation, the existing norms and values are dominantly agreed upon. However, when there is a change of the system of social relations, that is normative and institutional order, it happens that individuals and groups continue to operate in accordance with the values that correspond to the previous social system (as a result of slower changes in the value patterns compared to normative).

This brings us to the concept of value-normative system dissonance, which denotes the degree of compliance, or non-compliance of value orientation of a class with the ruling normative order. The larger is the gap, the greater the dissonance, and vice versa. The mismatch between the values and norms can occur without changes in the social system, in a situation of internal reorganization, without the substantive change of the principles on which the system works.

In such a situation, when there are different and even contradictory norms according to which the system works the unequivocal value basis leads to a state of intra-value-normative dissonance. As an example, here is a period of economic crisis, when many countries with developed market economies reached for state-interventionist measures for certain enterprises (vital) to be saved from destruction even though it is contrary to the elementary principles of the market economy.

Here it is necessary to introduce the concept of value consistency, which means the degree of identity (homogeneity) of the value orientation, and which on the analytic level is on the level of concurrency in the attitudes of members of the same social class. High consistency is a prerequisite for collective action towards the promotion and protection of class interests. If a social group has a high and valuable consistency and high dissonance, it can be a carrier of social changes that establish a new social order, or if it has a high consistency and low dissonance, this social group can be a mainstay of stabilization and the playback of the order. Social groups which have a pronounced evaluative inconsistency can not be the central player in social change, but at the best, they can only help change agents.

**Objectives.** This paper aims to examine the intensity and prevalence of value orientations of political liberalism and authoritarian collectivism among young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina at two points in time – in the period immediately before the fall of the socialist social order (1989) and in the period of post-socialist transformation, more precisely, after the effects of the global financial and economic crisis (2012). The analysis of empirical data will show the degree to which social consciousness, in the form of value orientations, follows the structural social changes that occur due to the establishment of the neoliberal model of capitalist regulation. The theoretical framework of the analysis relies on the theory of value-normative dissonance.

**Method and procedure.** The scale of political liberalism for 1989 originally contained the following eight items: *The judiciary must ultimately serve the authorities; Without a leader, every nation is like a man without a head; Full freedom of speech today leads to disorganization of society; There are two main types of people, strong and weak; The most important thing for children is to teach them obedience to parents; Collective interests must be more important than the interests of individuals; Multiparty system guarantees the expression of the interests of all social groups; Superiors should be listened to, even when they are wrong.* 

The scale of political liberalism in 2012 was identical to the first six items, and two more were added: *The media should have more understanding for power; The media that does not take into account the national interests should be banned.* 

Empirical data available to us were collected in two surveys. The first study is *"The changes in the class structure and mobility in Yugoslavia*", which was conducted in 1989 in all the republics of the former Yugoslavia on a sample that included almost fourteen and a half thousand respondents. From this sample, we have selected a subsample of young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina aged 18 - 29 years, 559 respondents. The sample was quota type, and the basis for the quota was accounted for classes that were operationalized through the jobs of respondents. The sample includes both employed and unemployed, and excluded pupils, students, private sector employees, housewives, and dependent persons with which the representativeness was violated.

Another study that was used to collect empirical data on the youth of the Doboj region in 2012, is our Source research. The sample consisted of an almost equal number of respondents as in 1989, and it is 553 respondents. The sample was stratified, multistaged, with strata of proportional size. Stratification was performed by combining the socio-economic and territorial respondents.

**Results.** The presence of the liberal value orientations at the end of the eighties was the result of the specific character of the Yugoslav self-management socialism (liberal and West facing open system in relation to the countries of the Soviet block) and the ideological crisis of socialism. On the scale of political liberalism, liberal orientation has been accepted by the ruling and the individual layers of the middle class (professionals and lower managers), while other classes were authoritarian-oriented.

Contrary to the expectation for the growth of political liberalism in the postsocialist period, which would be in line with the new normative and institutional order, there was its decline, and the growth of its opposing orientation – the authoritarian collectivism. In other words, the value-normative dissonance has not reduced but increased. **Conclusion.** It is evident that the value-normative dissonance in post-socialism has grown, which is contrary to the initial hypothesis. As the state of value-normative dissonance is unsustainable in the longer term, there must be a change in value orientations of the population, young people (which is a slow and hard task), or redefining of the strategies and directions of the Post-socialist transformation and the social reform could be more acceptable to citizens. Otherwise, the normative and institutional order will not have the necessary legitimacy, the reforms will be imposed "from above" (the joint efforts of the EU and local authorities), and the life of "ordinary people" will take place in accordance with the value-forms that more or less deviate from what is desirable and prescribed.

### POLITICAL VALUES IN POSTMODERN SOCIETY

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Introduction. What happens to political values in the VUCA (Volatility – Uncertainty – Complexity – Ambiguity) world? How does this phenomenon transform in the context of globalization, individualization, and rapidly changing political conditions? Today researchers in the field of psychology, sociology, philosophy talk about man's loss of reasons, and it happens when the core of values is destroyed. We live under conditions, Durkheim called «anomie»: when old values fell apart, and new ones are not created. It is essential that political values are a guideline that consolidates society. Moral dilemmas, social problem solving and decision-making are attributable to political values to a large extent (Rokeach). Moreover, in the countries of the modern world, including Ukraine, there is a divergence of political values (Van Houwelingen, Iedema, Dekker, 2018). And the problem is: If people do not have values, their opinions are unstable, they can easily be influenced through media manipulation and deconsolidation practices of political elites. And even if we have a democratic governmental practice, however «populous does not hold stable values that guide their political decisions, the government will have trouble translating majority preferences into policies. This [unstable unclear values] mitigates the effectiveness of any democratic government» (Connors, 2019, p.19).

**Objectives** of this article are the following: rethink the concept of political values, analyze their essence and status in the EU countries; consider key conditions that have a particularly strong impact on their transformation; present the trends of social transformations due to the current situation with political values (PV).

**Results.** Political values are transcendental towards specific situations; they act as a centering core that integrates different value systems in society. They are conscripted to guide citizen's decisions, to hold them as a committed group towards the priority goal achieving. Political values allow citizens to make value congruent decisions in the field of politics even in a changing context and in conditions of replacement of relevant and potential representatives of the authorities (Evans, Neundorf, 2018). To clarify the concept of political values, we rely on the definition of Van Houwelingen (2018, p. 2), "Core political values' as overarching normative principles and believing assumptions about government, citizenship, and society". Values construct an evaluative coordinate system; it serves as a basis for the formation of the attitudes to events, candidates, social and political problems, values also direct human actions. Core political values function as focal points in the process of developing political positions. Regarding the relation between general and political values, Connors says that General Values are stable and not sensitive to changing contexts. It acts as a compass that helps a person to navigate through contexts while remaining congruent in decision making and evaluations. Meanwhile, political values are more dependent on social conditions. People are motivated by social, contextually and culturally determined goals (Connors, 2019). We consider this contrast to be erroneous and agree with Schwartz, that core political values are anchored in basic personal values. Political values cannot exist separately; they are connected with basic values. In this case, politics is a specific context for the manifestation of the general values, which, due to their movement to a specific area, get the corresponding name. Political values are relevant to general, personal values and guide the decision-making and actions of people in the context of political life.

**Polarization of political values in Europe**. Inside the European countries, there is no central unifying core due to unformed and heterogeneous political values (Houwelingen, 2018). Significant value differences (migration, adoption of LGBT people, further European integration) between European countries complicate the possibility of integration and the development of a common European identity. In terms

of political values, Europe does not form a «macro society» that would differ from other macro-regions. At the same time, Europe is internally differentiated; its integration requires the development of common values. The dynamics of changes in political values demonstrate absence of their convergence since the beginning of the century, except for the value of «Europhilism», while the prevalence and similarity in the value of «Euroscepticism» has increased. Culture takes on the role of an integrating point that strengthens European identity and exalts shared values and cultural heritage. Thus, the values of countries, longer stayed in the EU, are more consistent with the values of the founding countries of the EU. Speaking about Ukraine, conflicts erupt periodically on different foundations: economic, religious, ethnic, political. In recent years (since 2014), the situation has escalated due to events, which updated the inconsistent value systems of citizens. Therefore, we are dealing with a conflict of an ambiguous attitude to the country's development vector, to political leaders, Maidan events and even military events in the country. The inconsistency of political values within the country leads to an internal split on the basis of significant and fundamental political issues.

### Exacerbating agents of values polarization.

1) Dominance of the local types of unity. The growing difference in values and views gives rise to polarization, consequently radical movements are being actualized. It is a so-called phenomenon of a «disappearing center» (Abramowitz, 2011). Center itself aims to fulfill the function of an integrating society. In Ukraine, where level of willingness to participate in government practices decreased, preference is given to group practices based on interests, which corresponds to the micro-level of consolidation according to Weber.

2) Elite polarization. More than ever, now we observe the strong polarization of elites and, due to this, increased polarization of the groups following them (Lupton, Smallpage, Enders, 2017). Therefore, the role of value orientations in relationship between ideology and party identity has increased significantly. This gives rise to strong identification, identification with in-group, at the same time out-group hate

towards those who hold opposing views. The elite does not use its consolidating potential. Appealing to values as a manipulative technology is used to unite the electorate groups and create an adherent towards a politician part of the population. It gives rise to internal conflicts within the government, sows hostility and misunderstanding.

3) Media space. It is impossible to ignore the influence of information space on the political values polarization process; it allows not only to construct a new reality, but a set of realities and each of them produces its own, autonomous system of values. An analysis of the sources shows that the polarization process is two-sided: first, we are talking about the ways of providing information by the media themselves. Secondly, consumers reinforce the informational distance between themselves due to the characteristics of their choice and the specificity of perception.

Subjective spaces in the network were named «information bulbs» (Pearson, Knobloch-Westerwick, 2019), which are created and fixed by the personally created selective informational space of unilateral ideas about a certain area of reality. It is a one-sided vision of reality. Selection of sources according to the principle of consistency with established views. «Bulb» is a kind of mechanism of psychological protection against the destruction of established elements of the worldview. Functionally bulbs relieve the discomfort of uncertainty and constant change, but at the same time, bulbs make it impossible to get acquainted with the arguments of the contrary, enshrine the person in his or her community.

In theory of political psychology, people consume those channels of political information that are ideologically consistent with theirs views. Selective exposure is an important principle when choosing online groups, profiles for subscription. This creates a digital communication that secures personal and political identity. In this context, the concept of "confirmation bias" appears. It is not new, but it is gaining ground in the context of its inclusion in the media environment. The effect of "confirmatory bias" is largely evident when information is received through television channels and online resources, and less so through print sources or podcasts.

On the one hand, the media itself provides citizens with polarized information and strengthens polarized positions. The capabilities of the media space allow citizens to create reality themselves through a selective exposure to information – this is how people create communities, where they allege one-sided vision of each other and develop their own autonomous system of political values.

**Conclusions.** In postmodern world we observe disappearance of the value center and polarization inside the countries. Old values fell apart, new values have not been developed – that disorientates people, gives rise to anxiety and the phenomenon of existential vacuum. People prefer to unite in local forms of unity, also on the basis of political issues – this is how their need to belong to something bigger than they are is being realized: they find like-minded people, and such kind of interaction gives a person a sense of security.

These associations complicate the implementation of state consolidation practices; group interests and identity become a priority rather than state interests and identity. It's a first factor of political values polarization. We have identified two more: views of the political elite representatives: there is no consensus between them, they do not contribute to the development of a new value apparatus. Uncertainty on higher level creates uncertainty at other levels of society.

Thirdly, in the era of active and ubiquitous technology, we mentioned the media space. We have shown that the media themselves and the specifics of people's work with information channels create the so-called «info bulbs», that strengthen the distorted picture of the human world. Bulbs deprive him or her of the opportunity to see alternatives, get acquainted with the arguments of the opposite position and develop a more complete, informed understanding of the world, including the political one. Therefore, today we need to discuss strategies for developing meta-values that would exceed individual, group, clan interests, and unite the state system to achieve the Plato's common good.

# POLEMICAL SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS ABOUT 'IMMIGRATION' IN JOURNAL ARTICLES OF DIFFERENT POLITICAL POSITIONING VIA FACEBOOK

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**Introduction.** Among the different social discourses diffused through the Internet – and in particular the social media – this contribution focuses on immigration as an object of perceptual distortion and ideological polarization through the lens of Facebook.

The diffused perception of the immigrants as the "*others*", the unknown, foreign is often assimilated with dangerous, extraneous and generally presented in the media as invaders, or stigmatized as potential terrorists, legitimizing fear and evoking the need for barriers and protection of the own territory by the population of the host country. On the other side, they are perceived as social victims or marginalized groups.

**Objectives.** Within a wider research program including interrelated *'field'* and *'media' studies*, this contribution is aimed at detecting social representations and attitudes according to the different ideological positions and identity affiliations, which guide the processes of social inclusion/exclusion towards immigrants through the analyses the political discourse via *Facebook* (among other social media analyzed: *Twitter, Youtube, Instagram*) and a rich set of complementary sources from multi-

voice and multi-agents (scientific, institutional and lay people) discourse (de Rosa et al., 2019, 2020a, 2020b, in press a, b).

**Method and procedure.** The sources of the results presented here include the journal articles, detected from the Facebook platform, selected from 1197 posts, related to the time frame 2014 – 2018. The data collection has been later expanded until 2020 in order to follow the evolution of the discourse and related policies towards immigrants in relation to the changes of the power relations in the Italian government led by different Premier of the Democrat Party (Letta, Renzi, Gentiloni) from 2014 to May 2018, followed by the 1<sup>st</sup> Government Conte (leading the coalition 5 Stars Movement and League from June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2018 to September 4<sup>th</sup>, 2019) until the 2<sup>nd</sup> Government Conte (leading the coalition 5 Stars Movement, Democrat Party and Italia Viva since September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2019).

The criteria used to select the articles are: 1) topic on immigration; 2) published during the period 2014 – 2018; 3) published by the pages of politicians or political parties; 4) belonging to officially deployed newspapers and politically positioned according to <u>https://forum.termometropolitico.it/719099-orientamento-politico-dei-quotidiani.html</u>.

The 406 sources selected from online Newspapers and magazines according to the political positioning, organized in three different corpora, are the following:

- 149 Left wing: journal articles from *Il Fatto Quotidiano, il Manifesto, La Repubblica, Left, Internazionale, Libero*, posted by Political Parties (*Partito Democratico, Potere al Popolo, Futura*) and Political Leaders (Marco Baciotti, *Maurizio Martina, Nicola Zingaretti, Emma Bonino Paolo Gentiloni Matteo Renzi, Paolo Beni, Pietro Grasso, Laura Boldrini, Giovanni Barbagallo, Fabrizio del Preite, Alessio Marchionna*);

– 118 Center Moderate area: journal articles from Ansa, Avvenire, Bari Today, Borderline, La Stampa, Rai news, Redazione TPI, Il Messaggero, Il Sole24ore, Euronews, l'Inkiesta, il Corriere, Tg24, Il Mattino; – 140 Right wing: journal articles from *Il Quotidiano, Libero, Il Giornale, il Secolo d'Italia, Il Tempo, La Nazione*) posted by Political Parties (*Fratelli d'Italia, CasaPound, Forza Nuova*) by Political Leaders (*Matteo Salvini, Giorgia Meloni, Vittorio Sgarbi, Barbara Saltamartini, Luca Marsella, Matteo Mazzanti, Silvia Sardone, Simone Di Stefano, Fabio Altitonante, Luca Zaia, Gianni Alemanno, Giovanni Donzelli).* 

It is interesting to note that political leaders belonging to the Italian *Movement 5* Stars (Luigi Di Maio, Alessandro Battista, Danilo Toninelli, Virginia Raggi...) cannot be positioned on the traditional ideological opposition between left-wing versus rightwing parties, neither on the moderate area at the centre: in fact the founding mission of the 5 stars is to be a populist anti-system movement alternative to ideology-driven politics still anchored into the last centuries history of opposed view of society driven by Marxism and Fascism. The "thin ideology" nature of populism (Muddle, 2004, 2007; Stanley, 2008; Mannarini, Veltri, Salvatore, 2020) due to its rejection, combination or oscillation between rightist and leftist ideologies find its core into the anti-elite position anchored into the dichotomous opposition between the "people" and the "elite" as antagonist groups in society: an assumption that becomes quite problematic when from the anti-governmental minority movement the 5 Stars have gained governmental power, with coalition first with the far right (Northern League) then with opposing leftist democratic forces in two different legislations led by the Premier G. Conte respectively from June 1st, 2018 to September 4th, 2019 and since September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2019.

The data collected have been analyzed by using GRAPHColl, a software that allows evaluating the links between words using certain criteria: distance, frequency, exclusivity, directionality, dispersion and feature films. The evaluation of the links between words within a corpus is useful for detecting how, within a context, some topics are covered.

The analysis of the three distinct bodies began with the keyword "immigration". Among the functions of the software, KWIC has been useful in reconstructing, for the different nodes, the list of words that proceed and follow it, contextualizing the keywords within their semantic field. With the analyses carried out it is possible to see clear differences regarding the topics on which the various journal articles are focused.

### **Results.**

*Left-wing discourse* - By analyzing "immigration" as a node, one of the first links is "reception". The other links formed are: "policies", "Decree", "asylum", "migrants", "applicants", "people", "municipalities", "part", "first", "center", "SPRAR" (*Sistema di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati*) the Ministerial service which in Italy manages the reception, assistance and integration projects for asylum seekers at local level, renamed as SIPROIMI: *Sistema di protezione per i titolari di protezione internazionale e per minori stranieri non accompagnati* since 2018 (Law 1-12-2018, n. 132).

The different words organise two semantic fields focused, on the one hand, the *political vision of immigration*, on the other the *reception centers*.

- Political vision of immigration/immigrants: there is a tendency to explain the Security Decree. It is interesting to note the connection of the Decree with the ASGI Association (Association for Legal Studies on Immigration) created to promote information, research and the training of immigration rights, asylum, discrimination and citizenship. The KWIC function, applied to one of the salient elements of the semantic field, the word "frontier", highlights how the articles tend to describe the difficulties of immigrants to pass the controls; stresses the importance of guaranteeing the right to seek asylum; notes the risk faced by immigrants during the journey; finally, it refers to landings also outside Italy, along the routes of Greece and Spain.
- *Reception centers*: when the "center" was considered as a node, other words on the network such as "detention", "camp" and "Tripoli" were displayed. By carrying out the KWIC function of the word "detention", the story focuses on the detention camps in Tripoli, Libya. In these places the illegal immigrants are locked up and

tortured; it is said that there are even shifts to sleep because there is no space for everyone on the ground...

*Center Moderate discourse* - In the results relating to sources not ideologically deployed on the politcal right-left poles '*Europe*' plays a determined role for the phenomenon of immigration. By carrying out the KWIC function for the word "European", Europe is presented very influential for the situation of Italian immigration and how projects, funds and summits are decisive for supporting reception, integration and protection. It is interesting to note the role of the word "opportunity": by applying the KWIC function the phenomenon of immigration appears as a very complex problem and every minimal opportunity can be useful to provide solutions. The chain "*Salvini-racial-hate*" knots confirms the distancing of these newspapers from the ideological vision characterizing the right wing.

*Right wing discourse* – By analysing "immigration" as a node, the following connections were developed: "State", "Decree" and "residency permit". Three themes revolve around keywords:

- European issues;
- Salvini and his Security Decree, at the time he was the Italian Minister of Interior (1<sup>st</sup> G. Conte Government);
- Daily events where immigrants are seen as protagonists.

The speech focuses on the conflicts Italy-France, on the closings of the borders and on the appeal of the Ambassador. It is interesting to note that despite this problem, Europe has been perceived as the solution for overcoming the immigration phenomenon, which is difficult to control.

Among various political leaders, Salvini is the absolute protagonist, with a great emphasis on "personification" in key of social representations. The presence of several related words, as emerges from the network analysis: "asylum", "protection", "international", "reception", "demand" and "borders", clarifies the thought of the Minister Salvini, who merely accepts and protects those who can apply for asylum. This term is in fact accompanied by "only"; therefore, the main struggle is against all those who try to enter Italy, although excluded from this right: "the SPRAR can therefore only accept holders of international protection, minors, simple asylum seekers".

Another preferential way of exclusion is criminality as highlighted by the KWIC function: "young man caught in the act of crime; his case ended immediately on the table of the Territorial Commission which rejected the request for international protection". The deviant vision appears with the keywords "crime" and "drug dealing". On the other hand, "the Decree created by Salvini provides for the expansion of the audience of crimes that will lead to automatic denial... "

**Conclusions.** The articles oriented to "left wing", "center moderate area" and "right wing" of the party spectre speak about the phenomenon of immigration, referring to the social and political situation.

As for the image of immigrants, the left wing adopts an otherness-centred perspective interested in their experiential travel issues and living conditions in reception centers, identifying them as 'victims' and emphasizing "inclusion as a right". The right wing tends to focus on other-rejection own nation-centred perspective guided by a criminalised social representations of immigrants as 'deviant', 'dangerous foreigners', and potential 'criminals', also manipulating citizen's fear of otherness, thus orienting voter's consensus on exclusion practices in the name of the defence of national sovereignty and security

Europe seems to be relevant above in the articles positioned in the center moderate area and its importance is generally recognized for an integrated management of the immigration phenomenon.

In brief, the polarized social representations are highlighted by:

the left-wing articles, underlining the need to respect human rights and therefore to allow reception; to emphasize the commitment of the Associations working to allow these rights, to inform about the phenomenon of immigration and the malfunctioning of the reception centres;

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- the right-wing articles, highlighting the commitment of Minister Salvini: to control the arrival of "immigrants" represented as potential criminals, in order to prevent the criminal acts of the illegal immigrants in Italy, to restrict welcoming people only to legal entries.

In conclusion, the results confirm – also through the selected journal articles via Facebook, as in other media sources investigated in the wider research program (de Rosa et al, 2020a, 2020b) – the highly polarized and polemical social representations of immigration, showing the connection with practices of inclusion / exclusion concerning the migration phenomenon, "competing with each other on the representational field for the creation or consolidation of specific power relations." (Raudsepp and Ventsel, 2020, 182).

### RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIATIZED SOCIAL OPTIMISM AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY

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**Introduction.** Means of mass communication swiftly develop, new multimedia technologies emerge, new social conditions of human life are formed such as changes in everyday life, activities, education and social practices. At the same time a human being changes – perception, imagination, behavior and correspondingly society changes. It was especially obvious during quarantine in conditions of Covid-19. The media, social media among them, are means of social reality construction, they supply not only with news but meanings and values, they form believes, evoke emotions. The development of information society determines the necessity to learn a system of conditions and phenomena of the modern information epoch which affect the formation of beliefs in society and human activity which can be attributed to information and communication technology.

That is why we focused on such a phenomenon as social optimism. Social optimism is essential for understanding basic mechanisms of social processes – social adaptation, socialization, social dialogue and so on. Social optimism is a socio-psychological foundation for societal transformations. It can become the basis for the transformations and development of society and gives support in individual psychological space.

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We consider social optimism as positive expectations of a person, group, society which spread on societal life (belief in progress, development of society), expectations which are supported by active citizenship position, readiness to act for the sake of societal good and understanding oneself as socially significant power. Societal activity of a person, in our opinion, is essential for evaluation of social optimism.

**Objectives** of this research were the following: to define peculiarities of social optimism phenomenon in media context; to reveal factors which shape its formation; to reveal phenomena which are effected by social optimism. In this article we present part of the research describing connection with citizenship activity.

**Method and procedure.** Survey was used as a method. The author's test of mediatized social optimism (MSO) was used. Approval and validation of MSO test were conducted within the all-Ukrainian mass survey, in which 1439 pupils from 17 regions of Ukraine participated (Voznesenska, 2019).

Mathematical processing was carried out using SPSS program. An analysis of data reflecting MSO showed internal consistency of the test scales (verified using the Alpha-Cronbach coefficient). To determine correlations, a nonparametric Spearman correlation coefficient was used. Normality of distribution was determined using the Kolmagov-Smirnov test; correlations were determined using Spearman's nonparametric correlation coefficient. Test-retest reliability was of MSO was proved.

Mentioned above survey also covered media-creativity of pupils as the highest form of media-activity (Voznesenska, 2011) and citizenship activity of resistance (patriotism scale in original Citizenship Behavior Questionnaire by A. Zalewska & B. Krzywosz-Rynkiewicz, 2011). The original scale of patriotism was translated into Ukrainian and adapted taking into consideration the war situation. We added questions: "I am preparing to struggle for Ukraine with arms in my hands when I am 18" and "When Ukrainians are praised I feel pleasure" (Bondarevska, Mykhaylenko, 2019).

**Results.** It is important to mention that we consider optimism and pessimism as two different phenomena which are not situated on the poles of the same continuum. Mediatized social optimism (MSO) and pessimism (MSP) are interpreted as behavioural strategies of information processing, ability for media content perception in a certain way, definite pattern of interaction with media.

First, we calculated correlations between scales of mediatized social optimism, mediatized social pessimism and citizenship activity of resistance. Statistically significant connection between scales of citizenship activity of resistance and mediatized social optimism was revealed (r = 0.363,  $p \le 0.01$ ).

Secondly, we compared levels of media creativity, MSO and MSP among pupils with low and high levels of citizenship activity of resistance. For that purpose, we used data from high and low distribution quartile of these scales (25 % of the highest weight and 25 % of the lowest weight). It was revealed that media creativity and MSO significantly differ among pupils with high and low levels of citizenship activity of resistance (p = 0,000). Media creativity is higher among respondents with high citizenship activity of resistance. Mediatized social optimism is also higher among respondents with high citizenship activity of resistance. Mediatized social pessimism does not differ among pupils with high and low citizenship activity of resistance (Table 1).

Citizenship activity of resistance		Media creativity	MSO
Low level	Means	17,49	8,70
(N=323)	Std. Deviation	9,62	4,10
	Median	18	8
High level	Means	21,96	11,09
(N=372)	Std. Deviation	9,03	3,47
	Median	22	12

Table 1. Comparison of mean values of media creativity and MSO among pupils with high and low levels of citizenship activity of resistance.

On the third phase of our research we considered differences in citizenship activity of resistance among groups of respondents depending on level of mediatized social optimism and mediatized social pessimism. We suggest that there are types of interaction with media without clearly shaped optimism and pessimism but rather combining both. We distinguished three groups of respondents depending on level of MSO and MSP combination (high level was determined according to the highest quartile, low level – according to lower than mean): 1<sup>st</sup> group contained respondents with low level of MSO and MSP (lower than mean). 1<sup>st</sup> group contained respondents with high level of MSO (25 % of the highest weight, the highest quartile) and MSP lower than mean, N = 162, 3<sup>rd</sup> group contained respondents with high level of MSO (25 % of the highest quartile) and MSP lower than mean, N = 162, 3<sup>rd</sup> group contained respondents with high level of MSP (25 % of the highest weight, the highest quartile) and MSO lower than mean, N = 125. Kruskal – Wallis test showed statistically significant differences between all three groups in citizenship activity of resistance. The highest citizenship activity of resistance is demonstrated by pupils with high level of MSO and low level of MSP. "Optimists" are more apt to change reality around them, they believe in their influence on societal processes and not only by means of media but also with arms in their hands (Table 2).

Table 2. Comparison of mean values of citizenship activity of resistance among pupilsbelonging to different groups depending on MSO and MSP level

		Citizenship activity of resistance
Respondents with low level of	Means	6,29
MSO i MSP	Std. Deviation	4,757
(N = 188)	Median	6
Respondents with high level of	Means	8,66
MSO and low level of MSP	Std. Deviation	4,721
(N = 162)	Median	9
Respondents with high level of	Means	5,4
MSP and low level of MSO	Std. Deviation	4,63
(N = 125)	Median	5

On the fourth phase of our research, we compared citizenship activity of resistance among pupils with different level of MSO and MSP (Wilcoxon test was used). For defining level of MSO and MSP we used data from high and low distribution quartile of these scales (25 % of the highest weight and 25 % of the lowest weight) (Table 3).

Table 3. Comparison of citizenship activity of resistance among pupils with low and high level of MSO and MSP

			Citizenship activity of resistance
MSO	Low level	Means	5,71
	(N = 326)	Std. Deviation	4,644
		Median	6
	High level	Means	8,81
	(N = 360)	Std. Deviation	4,8
		Median	9
MSP	Low level	Means	7
(N = 379)		Std. Deviation	4,681
		Median	7
	High level	Means	7,65
	(N = 367)	Std. Deviation	5,07
		Median	8

Statistically significant differences in citizenship activity of resistance were revealed among pupils with different level of MSO. At the same time there were no statistically significant differences in citizenship activity of resistance among pupils with different level of MSP. There were insignificant differences between pupils with high level of MSO and high and low levels of MSP. That is to say, "pessimists" with any level of mediatized social pessimism are ready to act for social changes, resist information war and vote (Table 3).

On the 5<sup>th</sup> phase of our research we revealed statistically significant differences in citizenship activity of resistance between pupils with different level of media creativity (Wilcoxon test was used). We distinguished pupils with high level of media creativity (25 % of the highest weight, the highest quartile) and pupils with low level of media creativity (25 % of the lowest weight, the lowest quartile) (Table 4).

Table 4. Comparison of mean values of citizenship activity of resistance among pupils with low and high media creativity

			Citizenship activity of resistance
	Low level	Means	6,05
	(N = 388)	Std. Deviation	4,419
Media		Median	6
creativity	High level	Means	8,35
	(N=385)	Std. Deviation	5,014
		Median	8

The most significant differences are revealed in citizenship activity of resistance in subscale of "Creation of content". Citizenship activity is significantly higher among those who create more media content.

**Conclusions.** Empirical research confirmed our assumption regarding the connection between social optimism and citizenship activity of resistance. We found differences in citizenship activity of resistance among pupils with high and low levels of mediatized social optimism and pessimism. It was revealed that pupils with high level of social optimism demonstrate the highest citizenship activity of resistance. That is to say, "optimists" are more apt to changing reality, believe in their influence on societal processes not only by means of media. Media creativity and mediatized social optimism are the highest among respondents with high citizenship activity of resistance. At the same time, pessimists with any level of mediatized social pessimism are ready to act for social changes, resist information war and vote. Those who create more media content are more ready for citizenship activity of resistance. As a perspective for further research, it is important to mention studying the connection between mediatized social optimism and other types of citizenship activity of resistance.

# EDUCATIONAL AND MEDIA CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSCIOUSNESS DEVELOPMENT

#### **ART-DEVELOPMENT IN ADULT EDUCATION**

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**Introduction.** The unpredictable world in which we live now was determined as VUCA-world in the U.S. Army War College in 1987. From 2002 this term has been used more often. Abbreviation VUCA reflects characteristics of the modern world: V – volatility, U – uncertainty, C – complexity, A – ambiguity. In conditions of VUCA-world situations of vulnerability are inevitable and all risks cannot be foreseen by contracts. VUCA-world can make you function in unpredictable conditions in which you will be vulnerable from your partner's behavior and you will need to develop new strategies because common strategies will not be effective anymore. The behavior of partners in such extreme situations depends on their values and behavior strategies.

Behavior corresponding strategy of survival contradicts strategy of development. Survival assumes rescuing oneself by "sinking" others – the strategy of preserving one's life in extreme situations. This strategy as a rule does not contain long-term planning. The strategy of augmenting one's resources by uptaking or subordinating others can be considered as a more complex strategy of survival as it contains longterm planning. The strategy of development on the contrary assumes preserving the balance of interests of all sides, mutual values and norms of partners.

The **goal** of the article is to shape directions for art-development techniques in adult education due to tendencies of VUCA-world which require readiness for the constant acquisition of new skills.

**Results.** Professional self-realization and success in conditions of VUCA-world depend on who is willing to cooperate with us. The strategy of survival repels potential partners, mutual professional activity with which could bring all sides of this activity to a new higher professional level.

Many decisions in conditions of VUCA-world when it is impossible to calculate all risks are made based on trust. Both reason-based and implicit trust becomes a necessary condition of economic and professional self-realization. At the same time, values should become orientation for personal and professional development in VUCA-world. Awareness of the relation between values on the level of normative ideals and the level of individual priorities is possible by means of traditional arttherapy techniques. It is especially effective to implement techniques based on the use of metaphors in adult education (e.g. metaphor of stairs, wheel of life balance, map of achievements, etc.).

Techniques of actualization of a person's potential which are used in postgraduate education are rather techniques of art-development than art-therapy. The necessity to refuse from well-tried ways of work performance is often connected to stresses, change of job, temporary unemployment, change of professional field. Specialists have to constantly acquire new knowledge and skills to remain in demand.

Art-development techniques through awareness of feelings, emotions, states help specialists to see inevitable changes from the point of opening perspectives for development, show the resourcefulness of constant learning. In conditions of permanent renewal of skills to remain competitive, psychological readiness for constant learning in adult age, despite professional achievements gained by outdated skills, becomes an indispensable condition for successful professional activity. Such readiness for constant learning can be also considered as prophylaxis of psychological traumatization in professional crises passing.

VUCA-world suggests such plurality of meanings that visual metaphor can be used as the most effective instrument which enables to connect personal meanings with ambiguous, changing meanings of VUCA-world without losing identity and compromising values. Orientation on personal values in uncertain VUCA-world requires awareness of these values and goals as orientation in behavior strategy choice and actions in each concrete situation. We consider visual metaphor as an inherent component of adult education due to the activation of emotional and intellectual spheres in conditions of ambiguous and uncertain meanings.

O. Ugryn (2020) considers metaphor as an instrument of emotional and intellectual spheres activation. Our mind turns to metaphor when it is difficult to find ready solutions, explanations, meanings. A situation with many unknowns provokes the process of metaphor creation. The process of metaphor creation includes such logical operations as comparison and analysis involving imagination what promotes understanding. The effectiveness of understanding through metaphor is attributable to its ability to activate emotional and intellectual spheres.

O. Molchanova (2020) describes scribbling as an unconscious way of traumatic experiences taking away, releasing excessive emotions and feelings. Every drawing through lines and forms reflects the unconscious. Projection of feelings on outer objects promotes recognition of feelings. Images accelerate verbalization of experience. Scribbling promotes the enhancement of self-esteem, confidence in opportunities, touches the sphere of the creative potential of personality, decreases the level of anxiety, promotes personal growth. According to Lebedeva (2006) people express their feelings by scribbling rather than creating an image or picture. Scribbles have high diagnostic potential, are considered as social maturity of personality.

Scribbling in a group promotes the formation of a respectful attitude to the expression of initiative from other group members. Group members do not need to

worry about the quality of drawings, estimation by others, it is an opportunity to relieve responsibility and stay in a role of a child (Molchanova, 2020). O. Voznesenska underlines that scribbling is a forceful regression to the period when any actions of a child caused delight and positive emotions of parents. That is why implementation of this technique causes joy even among adults. The following art-development technique can be considered for implementation in adult education.

### "The calendar of my emotions" (Bondarevskaya)

Take even number (4, 6, 8) of small rectangular sheets of paper which you will need to connect at the end of the exercise. Every day draw your emotions, feelings, and states on a sheet of paper by lines using colour pencils. Preferably avoid images of symbols or minimize them and draw symbols only when they are very important. The fullness of sheets by lines, their colours and diversity are on your preference. It is better to finish drawings in the evening and avoid returning to it next days. On the last day connect all sheets with transparent scotch from the side without drawings to make one sheet of paper out of eight.

What emotions does this connected collage raise in you? What emotions prevail? Would you like to change the spectrum of these emotions? What were the reasons for those emotions during those days?

M. Dolinova (2017) describing a similar technique "The calendar of scribbles" mentions the following results of such drawing: unexpected and unusual ideas, clarification of feelings, more precise understanding of the situation, improvement of the emotional state due to release of feelings during drawing.

This technique can be implemented in psychological support as additional to the main method. "The calendar of my emotions" can reveal what or who causes negative or positive emotions due to its lengths in time (4, 6, 8 days) and projective character as a person might not realize that consciously.

**Conclusions.** Professional crises in conditions of unpredictable VUCA-world are often connected to the destabilization of professional identity. When professional identity is basic in the system of social identities of a person professional crisis can

lead to changing professional field for the sake of solving this crisis accompanied by simultaneous balancing the system of social identities. One of the reasons for such a crisis can be the incompatibility of values and norms of a person and organization in which he/she works. In such cases, specialists can leave the professional field for the sake of "preserving oneself".

The shift from one professional sphere to another enables enrichment of crosssectoral experience, development of versatile potential for the sake of its further realization. Experience obtained in one sphere can become something to lean on when passing professional crisis in another sphere. Behavior strategies successfully implemented in previous spheres of professional activity can become winning because they are uncommon in the present sphere.

Thus, actualization, development, and realization of a person's potential often occur in the process of shifting from one professional sphere to another. Specialists in the state of professional crisis suffer from a decline of psychological well-being and require psychological support which can be included in the system of post-graduate education partly in the form of art-development following the *model of art-development* which includes actualization, development, and realization of a person's potential.

Art-development can be implemented not only through mentioned above metaphorical techniques but also through including virtual galleries in problematic discussions. For example, a virtual gallery "Art for non-discriminative values in education" can be a powerful tool empowering people with a deep understanding of different sides of the problem, especially if such gallery consists of metaphorical art like pictures of Vasilina Kolomiyko.

## FEATURES OF THE STUDENTS' EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS

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**Introduction.** Modern society is constantly in a state of transformation. This leads to change and fast integration into a new existence. Accordingly, each social group differently adapts to social change. Students are future professionals who need to be able to quickly mobilize their internal resources, capture emotions and be emotionally aware. In this, emotional intelligence helps them.

Intense information, education and communication flows, which are realized with the help of Internet technologies, create an enormous load on the mental activity of a student, affect his / her personality, and make adjustments in the social processes of society.

In modern terms of career development, a high level of emotional intelligence (EI) of a specialist is a requirement of the employer. Professionals who understand their emotions and feelings of other people can effectively manage their emotional sphere and, therefore, their behavior is more adaptive in the community, they attain their goals more readily in interaction with others in professional and interpersonal spheres.

During studies at university, a student can influence the development of his / her own emotional sphere, develop it, taking an active part in various training programs, choosing courses (with the student's free choice) aimed at developing EI. In such cases, in the future, there will be positively high levels of professional responsibility, intense interpersonal relations, stress resistance, which requires effective emotional and volitional regulation. The necessity of students' EI development is due to the fact that it contributes to the promotion of resultative and efficient interpersonal interaction in professional activity and prevention of emotional health of a future specialist.

A developed emotional culture, which basis is emotional intelligence, is a guarantee of a students' resilience to stressful situations in the period of professional learning. The development of emotional intelligence of a personality is also influenced by ability for social and psychological adaptation in student environment, insofar as it is emotional.

**Objectives.** Given the above, we can state that development of emotional intelligence of a student as a future specialist is an important component of positive professionalization of an individual in the context of social transformations. It should be noted that theoretical approaches to understanding the structure of emotional intelligence differ significantly among scholars. The purpose of this article is to reveal the essence, features of the emotional intelligence (EI) of a student and to consider the technologies of its development in the context of social transformations.

**Results.** In psychological science, the emotional intelligence of an individual is reflected in various aspects. Research of emotional intelligence involves such foreign scientists as R. Bar-On – non-cognitive theory of emotional intelligence, D. Goleman – theory of emotional competence, J. Mayer, P. Selovey, and D. Caruso – theory of emotional and intellectual abilities and other.

N. Hall's theory of emotional intelligence views emotional intelligence as a personal characteristic which allows one to recognize emotions, manage emotions, recognize emotions in each particular situation.

N. Hall focuses on five components of emotional intelligence:

- emotional awareness or theoretical knowledge about the emotional sphere and its regulation,

- stress resistance or emotional flexibility,

- self-motivation or arbitrary management of one's emotions,

- empathy or ability to empathize with other people,

 recognition of emotions of other people or ability to influence emotional mood of other people.

In domestic psychology, the idea of unity of affective and intellectual processes, which belonged to L. Vygotsky, was developed by S. Rubinstein and A. Leontiev. The essence of the idea is that the intellectual process is not possible without participation of emotions, and thinking has an emotional affective regulation.

One of the first domestic researchers of emotional intelligence was D. Lucin. He presented a two-component theory of this phenomenon. I. Andreeva considered the preconditions for the development of emotional intelligence, gender differences in expressiveness of components of emotional intelligence, as well as the possibility of developing emotional intelligence in the process of psychological training and demonstrated possibility of emotional intelligence developing through specially organized learning.

Analysis of scientific sources on the research problem showed that a number of terms related to emotional intelligence are used in psychological science, in particular: "emotional reasonableness", "emotional self-awareness", "emotional competence", "emotional thinking", "emotional enlightenment", "emotional endowment" and other. Such branching of definitions points to polycomponentity and integrativeness of emotional intelligence and angles from which modern scholars study it.

Thus, we understand emotional intelligence as an integrative personal property, which is caused by the dynamic unity of affect and intellect, through the interplay of emotional, cognitive, conative and motivational features. This property is aimed at understanding one's own emotions and emotional experiences of others, it provides the control over emotional state, subordination of emotions and the mind, promotes self-recognition and self-realization through the enrichment of emotional and social experiences.

On the basis of theoretical analysis, we can see that emotional intelligence (EI) is considered by scientists as not narrowly directed concepts which perform certain broad-spectrum functions, namely: - *interpretive function*, it enables a person to productively decrypt emotional information (emotional expressions of the face), which contributes to accumulation and categorization of knowledge, the formation of one's own emotional experience,

- *regulatory function* that contributes to the state of emotional comfort and ensures the adequacy of the external expression of human emotions,

- *adaptive and cretaceous function*, which lie in the actualization and stimulation of the human psychic reserves in complex life situations,

- an activating function that provides flexible capabilities in communication.

At the expense of the ability to quantitatively measure emotional intelligence, scientists can evaluate the degree of its impact on human achievement. There are many different technologies of developing emotional intelligence (EI), e.g. active participation in training programs, special study programs, use of individual exercises, etc.

For example, to develop understanding and control of your own emotions, you can use the following techniques:

- not to get involved in negative emotions, try to "switch" your thoughts to other things,

 if a person is very upset or feels guilty or ashamed, one can try to find the cause of this state and to understand it,

- if you are in a bad mood, you can turn to friends you know for help, but not keep negative feelings in yourself,

- if negative emotions are overflowing and one does not know how to get rid of them, you should try to joke with yourself, tell yourself that it is not healthy. Many life situations can be treated with humor. It alleviates anxiety, engages critical thinking and helps to control emotions.

Students of Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University were offered a study program "Psychology of Emotional Intelligence", which included not only theoretical but also practice-oriented material for the purpose of implementing:

- Module I. "Emotional intelligence - historical and philosophical origins",

- Module II. "Science approaches to understanding emotional intelligence",

- Module III. "Emotional intelligence as an integrative personality property",

- Module IV. "Development of emotional intelligence".

In the practical part, students have the opportunity to get acquainted with and apply different technologies, choose an individual approach that will suit each one individually. Students can also create and implement individual and group Emotional Intelligence (EI) projects.

The wealth of technology is to activate and develop student's emotional and intellectual resources in his or her professional development. Technology is based on productive intellectual activity.

Here are some of the key technologies that can be embedded in the learning process that will foster student's emotional intelligence (EI):

- social technology,
- technology of personality-oriented developmental learning,
- situational modeling technology,
- project technologies,

- technology of critical thinking,

- technologies of developing emotional intelligence by means of art-methods.

It is advisable to use these technologies because the development of educational material requires thorough student research. Working on projects students go through all stages of the technology of task fulfillment, providing management of the emotional state, subduing emotions to the mind, promoting self-recognition and self-realization through the enrichment of emotional and social experiences. Critical thinking techniques are used to resolve contradictions between student's life experiences and new information.

**Conclusions.** Emotional intelligence as an integrative property of a personality. It contributes to the effectiveness and resultativeness of interpersonal interaction in professional activity, emotional health of a future specialist.

The prospects of our future scientific explorations include the introduction of training courses and empirical research. This theoretical research does not exhaust all aspects of the problem of emotional intelligence and requires the expansion of scientific research. Practical implementation of a training program for the development of emotional intelligence in students needs to be realized in universities on the stage of their professional formation in the context of social transformation.

## IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AMONG YOUNG ADULTS

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**Introduction.** Impression management describes the efforts of an actor to create, maintain, protect, or modify an image held by a target audience (Bolino & Turnley, 2003). To achieve this goal, actors use a variety of specific impression management behaviors and tactics, such as compliments, designed to create a desired image (Bolino & Turnley, 1999). The sociologist Ervin Goffman was the first to find impression management as an objective field of study. He states that impression management refers to how individuals present themselves and their activity to others, how they guide and control the impression they are creating, how individuals promote their performance and abilities (Bolino, Kacmar, Turney & Lilstrap, 2008). The study of impression management dimensions is relevant from both, theoretical and empirical points of view as a relatively new research topic in the local context.

Discursive impression management strategies are described by Bilbow and Young (1996) as "those linguistic, intentional or unintentional linguistic behaviors that create and maintain impressions with or without a conscious purpose." Impression management is also defined as a "conscious or unconscious attempt to control the images that are projected into social interactions" (Constantin, 2009). The motivation to manage the impressions of others about oneself depends on the value that the purpose for the person has and the relevance of the impressions to achieve this goal (Elis, West, Ryan & Deshon, 2002). Jones (1964) argues that the more favorable the results of a person's actions towards another individual, the more tactic of ingratiation will manifest that individual towards that person (Gardner & Martinko, 1988).

**Objectives.** The recent study was designed to investigate the particularities of youth impression management strategies in various social contexts. In order to carry out the research, we considered the non-experimental methods approach, the research of phenomena as they are, without manipulating the subjects or variables involved in the process. We aimed to perform cross-sectional research, the investigated phenomenon being measured in a single moment, the values describing the characteristics measured in a single time section. The selection of the respondents and the measurement of the research variables were performed only once, followed by the analysis and elaboration of conclusions based on obtained data. The research results represent a description of the investigated characteristics, as it is manifested at that moment, based on the sample results, with the possibility of generalization on the reference population.

**Method and procedure.** For the study of impression management strategies, we used the Impression Management Scale developed by Bolino & Turnley, (1999) based on two scales already elaborated in the 90s (Kumar & Beyerlein, 1991; Wayne & Ferris, 1990). Bolino and Turnley (1999) classified impression management strategies into 5 behavioral tactics: (1) self-promotion, demonstrating skills and achievements to appear competent; (2) ingratiation, using flattery and doing favors to look nice; (3) exemplification, doing things better than required and in a larger volume than necessary to demonstrate that is dedicated or superior; (4) intimidation, threatening or harassing in an attempt to appear dangerous and powerful; (5) supplication, presenting oneself as weak or dependent to get help.

The Impression Management scale contains 25 items, the subjects evaluate the frequency of manifestation of a certain statement, being asked to indicate how often they use the listed behaviors. Answers range from 1 to 5 (1 – almost never, and 5 – almost always). Some statements specific to this scale: "Speak proudly about your experience or education"; "Do personal favors to others to show that you are friendly."

Subjects were randomly selected, participation in research being voluntary. A group of 527 respondents was considered for the processing and interpretation of

results, out of which: 225 respondents (43 %) are male and 302 respondents (57 %) are female, the age of respondents is between 18 - 27 years, of which: 182 young women and 138 young men aged 18 to 19 (61 %), 117 young women and 84 young men aged 23 to 23 (38 %) and 1 % young men and women aged 24 to 27. The respondents are students and were grouped into 4 categories according to the discipline of studies: humanities (foreign languages, literature), social sciences (psychology, history and philosophy, law), biological sciences (stomatology, general medicine, pharmacy), and technical sciences (urbanism and architecture, computers and computer science, physics and engineering, information technologies, mathematics). The sample of respondents are students within 3 top higher education institutions in the Republic of Moldova: Moldova State University, Technical University and University of Medicine and Pharmacy.

**Results.** The analysis of the subscale items of the Impression Management Questionnaire developed by Bolino and Turnley (1999) showed that they are sufficiently reliable, Cronbach Alpha tests indicating coefficients higher than .70, which according to Hinkin (1995) is an accepted common indicator of measurement of reliability and internal consistency: (1) self-promotion scale:  $\alpha = 0.85$ ; (2) ingratiation scale:  $\alpha = 0.81$ ; (3) exemplification scale:  $\alpha = 0.74$ ; (4) intimidation scale:  $\alpha = 0.80$ ; (5) supplication scale:  $\alpha = 0.84$ . These results suggest that the translated and adjusted scale developed by Bolino and Turnley (1999) is a reliable tool for investigating young people's impression management strategies.

According to the data, the most used impression management strategies are the self-promotion statements, with an average score of 3.01 points out of a maximum of 5. At the opposite pole is the supplication, with a score of 1.89, followed by the intimidation scale (2.25 points). The ingratiation and exemplification scales accumulated on average 2.51 and 2.66 points. In the study of impression management strategies, Bolino and Turnley (1999) obtained averages of: 2.95 for the self-promotion and ingratiation scales; 2.29 on the exemplification scale; the lowest scores were also recorded for intimidation (1.91) and supplication (1.62).

Although women accumulated a higher score on the self-promotion scale (3.07), compared to men (2.92 points), according to the results obtained based on the independent T-test, there are no gender differences in the manifestation of this type of impression management strategies: t = 1.929, p <.05. As for the exemplification scale, where men accumulated slightly higher scores than women (2.74 and 2.60), according to the results obtained based on the independent T-test, there are also no gender differences: t = -1,744, p < .05. Significant differences in the use of impression management strategies by women and men were identified on the ingratiation scale, where women recorded an average of 2.38 compared to men who recorded a higher average (2.67), according to the independent T-test: t = -3.833, p = 0.000142. Intimidation scale is led by young men, as women also recorded a lower average score (2.06) compared to men (2.50), this significant difference being also reflected in the results of the independent T-test: t = -5.978, p < .00001. A similar situation is attested in the results of the intimidation scale, where men recorded a higher average score (2.04) compared to women (1.77), the independent T-test, resulting in significant differences: t = -3.642, p = .000297.

The correlation between the 5 types of impression management strategies reflects a trend of the positive correlation between the various dimensions of impression management strategies, suggesting that people generally tend to either engage in the use of impression management strategies or to avoid the involvement of impression management strategies in their behavior. According to the Pearson correlation test, the strongest correlation occurred between ingratiation and exemplification (r = .486, p = 0.01, bilateral). The next strongest correlation occurred between ingratiation and supplication (r = .472, p = 0.01, bilateral).

**Conclusions.** The present study of the impression management strategies among young adults, first, confirmed the validity and reliability of the Impression Management Scale and is an additional confirmation of the fact that the scale can be applied to young people in order to identify the most frequently used impression management strategies. The results of the study revealed that self-promotion is the

most used impression management strategy among young adults and supplication – the least, also, young women use less ingratiation, intimidation and supplication strategies compared to young men.

The strong correlation between ingratiation and exemplification, according to Bolino & Turnley (1999), is evident, as from the theoretical perspective, these two impression management strategies should demonstrate the strongest correlation, because both ingratiation and exemplification are used as an attempt to create a favorable self-image, without emphasizing one's achievements. The next strongest correlation is between intimidation and supplication results; according to Bolino and Turnley (1999) these two tactics of impression management are considered to be the most negative compared to all the other dimensions.

The obtained results are comparable to the ones obtained by other authors, including the researchers who elaborated the scale, Bolino and Turnley in 1999. The results obtained by the present study, offer an objective and perspective ground for further research that would lead to a better understanding of other personal factors that influence the impression management strategies used by young adults in various social contexts.

# LOCAL COMMUNITIES AS A SOURCE OF INTERCULTURAL LEARNING: THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERCULTURAL VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE AND COUNSELLING PRACTITIONERS AS SELF-DIRECTED LEARNERS

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**Introduction.** Intercultural knowledge as a range of cognitive, affective, and behavioral skills and characteristics that help us to interact successfully with people from different cultural backgrounds (Bennett, 2008) is approached autonomously but also in relation to citizenship. Kymlicka (2007) points out that the right to express and represent cultural specificities is one of the fundamental political rights. Alygizakis (2006) also mentions: *"The status of a citizen must go beyond cultural peculiarities without eliminating them."* 

According to Gundara (2015), the democratic ethos is only partially cultivated within the educational system and sometimes it is even canceled when it is out of it, by parents and adults, so it is important to spread it to the wider community through all learning environments, so that through critical intercultural education all citizens will come into contact with humanitarian practices. In intercultural learning, in terms of understanding and appreciating other cultures, an important parameter is the awareness of our personal assumptions and of the way in which human relations, the collegiality which we belong to, influenced our way of thinking, our behavior and our interactions (Barrett ed all, 2014; Bennett, 1995; Noel, 1995). Intercultural social capital exists when, according to Arvanitis (2013), all social forces of a country find their place in official political and social life, cooperate systematically regardless of origin and religion, exchange views and work together on current problems. To the question "*in what learning environments the intercultural capital of an individual could be* 

increased" Pöllmann (2016) confirms the above view answering very aptly "the more our experience increases from the way of living of other cultures, the more we demythologize our own." In modern teaching approaches, citizenship education facilitates the active participation of all citizens in daily life and work (Johnston, 2003; Toiviainen et all, 2019). Through a learning process that follows the principles of justice and democracy, it aims at the ability to analyze, to solve existing problems and to socialize in interaction with the collectivities of the local community that are able to function as the most appropriate learning environments (Gillespie, 1981; Holford, 2006; Karakatsani, 2001; Wenger, 2010). The development of relevant collective consciousness-raising actions, the smooth coexistence of intercultural social groups, the creation of open spaces and squares for hosting such actions, the familiarization of mobile populations with the prevailing culture in the host country, are strategies of the institutions and of the civil society that can contribute to the redefinition of their individual, social and political identity, to the development of a sense of community, security and joy and to the harmonious coexistence of natives and foreigners, always with respect for the laws and customs of the host country (Harvey, 2007; Zarkia, 1992).

**Objectives.** The discussion presented herein is part of a broader doctoral research whereas exploring vocational counsellor's reflective observations about their experience, individual changes and counseling interventions we tried to clarify how they managed to develop their intercultural competencies in order to be proactive and functional in counseling culturally diverse individuals. Purposes and individual objectives are summarized in four main research questions: How do the experienced counselors perceive and define intercultural vocational guidance and counseling?; how do they meet the requirements of vocational guidance and counseling for the unemployed with a different cultural orientation?; what characteristics/skills help them to apply effective intercultural vocational guidance and counseling?; through which paths do they form these characteristics in the course of time?

This text focuses on the fourth research question and more specifically on the role that the city and generally the place of participants' residence plays in the development of their intercultural knowledge and competence, according to their opinion.

**Method and procedure.** The personal experience of thirty experienced vocational guidance and counseling practitioners in relation to the research subject was analyzed -through the qualitative approach and the grounded theory methodology- in order to identify regularities, to form categories of different levels of subtraction and, to construct a theory (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser and Strauss, 1967).

**Results.** Based on the analysis of the empirical material, has been developed a theory titled: "Unemployment counseling practitioners for counselees of diverse cultural backgrounds: the path towards deconstructing diversity. An empirically grounded theory of a life-long, self-guided, empirical and multicultural procedure of learning, based on consecutive cognitive projects, which aim to tackle challenges in the field."

According to the participants' narratives, it became obvious the importance of the local community where they grew up and city where they practice their profession as a source of intercultural learning. Indicatively, one participant estimates that he/she learns through personal participation or also by being actively involved in social events that take place in his / her city. Characteristically, he/she mentions: "*I think that to this [intercultural competence] contributes the personal participation in social events; it can be acts of solidarity, it can be [actions] of understanding a society that is constantly changing and bringing new data. In other words, maybe the personal need to understand what is happening around me and to adapt my work to it." With the same reasoning, another participant adds the decisive role of the action of the third sector, the role of the solidarity places organized by the civil society and also the awareness of the multicultural history of his city: "[I was helped] by the social actions and the places that support all this interculturalism and a view to a certain extent of the history of the city of Thessaloniki, of the interculturalism." A third participant mentions as a determining factor the tolerance of his fellow citizens towards diversity* 

as he experienced it during his adulthood in his place of origin "I come from a place where in addition to being open people also show respect for diversity. Take heed! To the one they know. In other words, I would say a background that I had from my village, the open society in which I lived. It's actually how you grew up, but beyond that it's also what experiences you have with diversity."

Findings generally reveal that participants are constantly on the alert with a steady mood for change and actively self-directed learning. They monitor changes in the profession of vocational guidance and counseling but also in the economy, the social changes and the current labor market, update and delve into scientific knowledge and skills. Through their own learning initiatives, they have gradually increased their selfefficacy in relation to providing qualitative both individual and group intercultural vocational guidance and counseling. In particular, they set goals, identify learning opportunities, select learning environments and ultimately evaluate the outcome in their work (Brookfield, 2013; Tough, 1971). Referring to the local community as a learning environment, according to their narrations, they networked with city institutions and civil society, taking advantage of the possibilities of volunteerism and develop a high sense of responsibility (Grow, 1991; Kegan, 2007). Networking development has contributed to their substantial familiarization with material (food and commonly used artifacts), social (language, religion, laws, rules of social contacts) and subjective culture (beliefs, norms, attitudes, values) of all the intercultural vocational guidance and counseling target groups (Barrett et all, 2014; Knowles, 1975). Generally, fieldwork experience dealing with current problems, exchanging ideas with professionals experienced in the field worked as a learning process and a source of intercultural education.

**Conclusions.** Based on the grounded theory methodology, the findings highlight learning through formal and non-formal learning environments as the main parameter of the development of participants' intercultural competence. As an important source of intercultural learning, participants perceive their place of residence now and during adulthood. They refer to the way in which they were influenced by the openness of the

inhabitants and by their tolerance for anything different. The participants do not fail to note the role of the facilitation provided by the city such as access to related literature, activities (festivals, lectures, book presentations, etc.), networking with experts and volunteering opportunities that in general help you to get acquainted with different types of target groups in the field. Undoubtedly, findings reveal that participants in this research consistently seek to direct their own learning making the most of the available community-based intercultural learning opportunities.

## THE MEDIA AS A FACTOR OF BODILY EGO DEVELOPMENT IN ADOLESCENCE

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**Introduction.** In order to determine the role of the media in the constitution of the Bodily Ego in adolescence, it should be recalled that the body is related to a number of psychological features of this period, namely:

- awakening and strengthening of partial drives with further integration and redirection from autoeroticism to an object (Freud, 1905; Lacan, 1953);

- increase in sexual curiosity (Morgenstern, 1937);

discovering of the female that determines the possibility of a division of the sexes
 into "feminine-masculine" instead of "phallic-castrated";

reactualization of the Oedipal issues and castration anxieties (Lesourd, 2002, 2013; Druzhinenko, 2012);

protest against the Father's law and overthrowing of the Oedipal Super-Ego in order to build a new Social Super-Ego (Lesourd, 2002, 2013; Druzhinenko, 2012);

- the fragility of Ego due to the failure of earlier defenses (Dolto, 2016);

loss and grief about the former child's body and place (Velykodna 2013;
 Velykodna, Bobrysheva, 2020).

Psychoanalysts note that, in search of answers, an adolescent knocks off one's parents from the pedestal of «knowledgeable» and looks for new sources of answers to his or her questions.

**Objectives.** The aim of this article is to share the results of the theoretical analysis of the media as a factor of influence on establishing the relation between physicality and Ego.

#### **Results.**

Select an object or to become an object for another. It is described as masculine and feminine positions of the subject's mental sex (Lacan, 1966). An adolescent is given specific standards by the media: sex symbols, idols, etc. Culture sets them as the most desired objects, therefore a specific subject as a social member should accept that (masculine position) or should want to be like that (feminine position) (Chzhin, Chibisova, 2015). Several studies show that some women, wanting to represent themselves as an object of desire, feel special anxiety about their appearance, as well as experience shame, dissatisfaction and other negative emotions in situations of real or imaginary non-compliance with the standards (Fredrickson, Roberts, 1997; Madison et al., 2019). However, the studies also show that men are less involved in this (Engeln, 2017).

Overall, studies of a number of authors show that the desired image of the opposite sex for men is an attractive appearance; whilst for women, it is high income and social status (Guadagno et al., 2012). Consequently, female adolescents are concerned mostly on their appearance, for instance, they tend to have a more aesthetic profile picture on social networks; male adolescents more often demonstrate their favorite type of activity there (Manago et al., 2008; Shchekoturov, 2012).

Analysis of girls' statements shows that the image of the fashion doll correlates with their ideas about the body standard (Kholmogorova, 2014) and that tendency does not change in adolescents (Buhlina et al, 2018).

*Feminine-masculine.* The discovery of this dichotomy is very significant for psyche (Lacan, 1966; Lesourd, 2002). Culture transmits nominal feminine-masculine markers through the media (Bolohova, 2006). For example, special attention to one's beauty care is marked as a female practice; male approach there is to be rather neglectful. Overall, many researchers indicate that such words as "beauty", "physical perfection", "visual attractiveness", "sexuality", "physicality" are associated more with a woman than a man (e.g. Karabina, 2010). Besides, there is a clear division of outfit into female (skirt) and male (shirt) clothes from the point of culture.

*Trial behavior*, which means exploration of the body in various situations. The media is both a source of behavior models (Janbarisova, 2014) and space where it could be tested, for instance, by forming of a "fake body" (Shchekoturov, 2017), which forces a person to act in a certain way in virtual space. Some researchers indicate that the higher the publicity of a page in social networks is, the more an individual tends to demonstrate their fake identity (Michikyan, 2015).

*Protest*. Changing the appearance for the sake of protest is called "bodily protest" (Batsanova, 2015). It can be manifested through piercing, tattooing, scarring, as well as a flamboyant appearance. Any such practice is rather culture-caused, transmitted by the media (Batsanova, 2015).

*Cognition of one's psyche.* This process happens through attempts to answer the question "Who am I?". Belonging to a certain group or subculture plays an important role here. Most of them have a set of ideas about how their member should look like and the media represent that. If a member transforms one's appearance not only by changing their outfit but also by modifying their bodies (piercing, tattoo, hairstyle), his or her status will grow (Malahova, 2011), as he or she demonstrates this way maximum affiliation to this group.

*Cognition of one's body.* This process is implemented through the symbolical attribution of a certain sign to each part of the body, e.g. "my nose is nice", "my lips are thin" (Aulagnier, 1986). In this case, the media is a source of assessments and templates for comparison (Karabina, 2010). There is a fact that children learn cultural biases about overweight people by the age of 5 (Ramsey, Harkort, 2011), which is explained by some studies through the influence of the image of the most popular dolls, such as Barbie (Dittmar et al, 2006).

Generally, active social media engagement often negatively affects one's body perception (Cohen et al., 2017). For example, intending to inspire one's self to get physically fit by photos in Instagram led to significantly higher negative mood and body dissatisfaction (Prichard et al., 2020). However, there are different types of engagement and active commenting affects much more than passive consumption (Hogue, Mills, 2018).

J. Poddubnaja interviewed women aged from 15 to 35 about their body image, fashion, beauty standards, etc. (Poddubnaja, 2007). It was found that women's self-esteem is directly associated with appearance. In addition, participants showed that they have a strong link between outer characteristics (appearance), and inner characteristics, such as financial success, intelligence, and life success. In addition, the researcher showed that 72 % of respondents believe that the media promote a "90-60-90" standard of beauty. With age, the number of women with a positive attitude to standards and with desire to follow it decreases. Nevertheless, 100 % of women in the age of 15 - 17 accept the standards. This contradicts the data on adolescent protest, so we decided to try to explain it.

In order to explain it, we need to emphasize that there has been a study that analyzed the characteristics of attractive glossy magazines (Stepanova, Reznikova, 2015). Among them there are the following: a) prevalence of illustrative material over textual; b) prevalence of luxury and premium goods in advertising, which are non-affordable for most readers; c) prevalence of successful young people with symbols of high status among the magazine characters; d) targeting content on individualism and hedonism, not family values.

Therefore, the inaccessibility of most of the magazine's content (demonstrated life, the advertised goods) could supposedly frustrate and repel, but for some reason it attracts. This is probably necessary to reinforce the subject's fantasy about the existence of phallus: the power is in hands of successful, attractive people. Believing in this, adolescents accept and strive for beauty standards, sometimes even successfully; at the same time, the media is a constant source of reinforcement of this faith. With age, gaining maturity, the subject also accepts castration: "I probably will never get it (power) ... and few people get it (despite having ideal body)." The result of this is the refusal to follow imposed standards and the acceptance of castration as common, inherent to everyone.

**Conclusions.** Overall, the results consistently reflect that each of the considered features of adolescence can be influenced by media content as a source of material from which the subject constructs their answers:

selecting the object by offering standards of objects;

existence of "feminine-masculine" dichotomy by offering markers of distinction
 of male and female activities and appearance features;

- trial behavior by offering a safe platform for experimentation;

bodily protest by offering protest models;

 cognition of one's psyche by offering information about rules of behavior of objects that are attractive for identification;

 cognition of one's body by offering assessments and templates for comparison and by helping to inhibit the castration.

Thus, the Bodily Ego, due to the media, receives more sense-making supports and examples that allow the adolescent to create, overthrow, use and discard various selfimages in this difficult time for them. However, the proposed hypothesis needs empirical and clinical investigations, especially in situations such as in Ukraine, where studies show that there is a lack of trust in news media (Bondarevskaya, Mykhaylenko, 2019).